Direct democracy and government size : evidence from Spain by Sanz Alonso, Carlos




Documentos de Trabajo 
N.º 1709
2017
DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNMENT SIZE: EVIDENCE FROM SPAIN
Documentos de Trabajo. N.º 1709
2017
(*) A previous version of this paper covered a more limited sample period (2002-2011). I am thankful to Manuel 
Bagüés for sharing the budget data for the entire period in which the 100-inhabitant threshold separated the two 
systems (1987-2011).
(**) E-mail address: carlossanz@bde.es. Full postal address: C/ Alcalá 48, 28014 Madrid, Spain. I gratefully 
acknowledge financial support from the Princeton Research Program in Political Economy. I am very thankful to 
Thomas Fujiwara for his guidance and support. I thank Alfonso Gordaliza for numerous conversations and 
detailed information on the direct-democracy system, José Miguel Rodríguez for his help in managing 
and understanding the data, and Samuel Suskind for outstanding research assistance. I also thank Jorge Álvarez, 
Marco Battaglini, Angus Deaton, Bo Honoré, Federico Huneeus, Matias Iaryczower, John Klopfer, Ilyana Kuziemko, 
John Londregan, Fernanda Márquez-Padilla, Eduardo Morales, Thomas Romer, Tom Vogl, and seminar participants 
in Princeton University, the Spanish Economic Association Symposium, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Banco 
de España, Universitat de Barcelona, CaixaBank Research, and the Royal Economic Society Conference for their 
comments and suggestions. I am solely responsible for any remaining errors.
Carlos Sanz (**)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA
DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNMENT SIZE: 
EVIDENCE FROM SPAIN (*)
The Working Paper Series seeks to disseminate original research in economics and fi nance. All papers 
have been anonymously refereed. By publishing these papers, the Banco de España aims to contribute 
to economic analysis and, in particular, to knowledge of the Spanish economy and its international 
environment. 
The opinions and analyses in the Working Paper Series are the responsibility of the authors and, therefore, 
do not necessarily coincide with those of the Banco de España or the Eurosystem. 
The Banco de España disseminates its main reports and most of its publications via the Internet at the 
following website: http://www.bde.es.
Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes is permitted provided that the source is 
acknowledged.  
© BANCO DE ESPAÑA, Madrid, 2017
ISSN: 1579-8666 (on line)
Abstract
Direct democracy is spreading across the world, but little is known about its effects 
on policy. I provide evidence from a unique scenario. In Spain, national law determines 
that municipalities follow either direct or representative democracy, depending on their 
population. Regression discontinuity estimates indicate that direct democracy leads to 
smaller government, reducing public spending by around 8%. Public revenue decreases 
by a similar amount and, therefore, there is no effect on budget defi cits. These fi ndings can 
be explained by a model in which direct democracy allows voters to enforce lower special-
interest spending.
Keywords: public fi nance, political economy, direct democracy, government spending, 
defi cits, budget, regression discontinuity. 
JEL classifi cation: D7, H.
Resumen
La democracia directa se está expandiendo por el mundo, pero aún se sabe poco sobre 
sus efectos en las políticas públicas. En este artículo se da evidencia a partir de un 
escenario único. En España, la Ley determina que los municipios se rijan por un sistema 
de democracia directa o representativa, dependiendo de su población. Mediante una 
regresión de discontinuidad, se estima que la democracia directa lleva a un menor tamaño 
del gobierno, reduciendo el gasto público en alrededor de un 8 %. Los ingresos públicos 
disminuyen en una cantidad similar y, por tanto, no hay un efecto en el défi cit. Estos 
resultados pueden explicarse mediante un modelo en el que la democracia directa permite 
a los votantes imponer un menor gasto en intereses particulares.
Palabras clave: economía pública, economía política, democracia directa, gasto público, 
défi cit, presupuestos, regresión de discontinuidad.
Códigos JEL: D7, H.
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1 Introduction
A pressing concern about representative democracy is that it leads to a government
that is too large.1 As noted by Besley and Coate (2008), that citizens have only
one vote to cast for candidates who have responsibility for choosing a bundle of
issues may lead to policies that are incongruent with the position favored by the
majority. In particular, if politicians are interested in increasing spending to favor
special-interest groups, then representative democracy will result in overspending.
One way to align policy with the preferences of the median voter is to expand the
use of direct democracy, in which people decide policy initiatives directly.2 By
issue unbundling, direct democracy allows the median voter’s preferences to prevail
along different dimensions and, therefore, constrains politicians’ ability to increase
expenditures (Matsusaka (2005)).
The theoretical development of this argument coincides with a dramatic expan-
sion in the use of direct democracy across the world. In emerging countries, decisions
at the local level are increasingly adopted in participatory meetings. These include
the Gram Panchayat in India, the participatory budget (Conselho do Orc¸amento
Participativo) in Brazil, and many others in countries such as Bolivia, Indonesia,
Mexico, Peru, Uganda, and Venezuela. In the United States, town meetings are
widely used at the local level in New England, and voters have decided more than
1,600 state-wide ballot propositions in the 21st century.3 In Europe, direct voter
participation is a hallmark of Switzerland and has become increasingly popular at
the local level in Germany. Its use also has been debated in Italy, the Netherlands,
Spain, and in European Union’s institutions.
In this paper, I empirically test whether direct democracy in the form of par-
ticipatory meetings reduces the size of government. Despite the rapid expansion of
direct democracy in recent years, settings with an exogenous source of variation in
the use of direct democracy are rare. As a result, it is difficult to obtain credible
4A noteworthy exception is Hinnerich and Pettersson-Lidbom (2014), but they study a historical
context—Sweden in the period following the introduction of universal suffrage in the 1920s—and
focus on welfare spending. Previous literature is summarized by Matsusaka (2005).
causal estimates on the effects of direct democracy.4
1Besley and Case (2003) argue that “there is a widespread belief that agency problems lead to
a government that is too large” under representative democracy.
2Direct democracy is a form of democracy in which people decide policy initiatives directly,
as opposed to representative democracy, in which people vote for representatives who then de-
cide policy initiatives. The main forms of direct democracy are participatory or town meetings,
referendums, and initiatives.
3From 2001 to 2015, 1,645 state-wide ballot measures have been voted in the United States.
Source: www.ncsl.org. Also in the US, direct democracy has been one of the battlegrounds of the
Occupy Wall Street movement.
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I provide evidence from a unique scenario to study the effects of direct democ-
racy on policy. In Spain, national law mandates that municipalities operate under a
direct or representative democracy, depending on the size of their population. Mu-
nicipalities with 100 or more inhabitants follow a representative-democracy system,
while those with fewer than 100 inhabitants use direct democracy. Under repre-
sentative democracy, citizens elect a city council every fourth year, and the council
decides on policy. Under direct democracy, the role of the city council is played out
in open town meetings held approximately four times a year.
This institutional framework presents several attractive features. First, the use
of direct or representative democracy is determined by population size, as mandated
by a national law. This allows the use of a regression discontinuity design to esti-
mate effects. Second, no other rule changes at the threshold, unlike what is often the
case for municipal population thresholds. I therefore can attribute the differences
between municipalities at each side of the threshold to the government system and
not to some other regulation. Third, the number of observations is large, leading
to precise estimates. There are more than 8,000 municipalities in Spain, and, fur-
thermore, many municipalities have a population size close to the threshold (around
2,000 municipalities with a population of 250 of fewer inhabitants—see Appendix
Table A1). Fourth, Spanish municipalities have substantial autonomy in both ex-
penditures and revenues. As a result, there is considerable variation in fiscal policy
across them. For example, the municipality in the 90th percentile of expenditures
spends four times more than the one in the 10th percentile.
I employ a rich panel dataset that contains yearly data from the budgets of mu-
nicipalities in the period 1988–2011. An issue that requires careful attention is that
some sorting is observed around the threshold. I show that a regression discontinu-
ity design extended with municipality and year fixed effects, that exploits switches
in government system of municipalities over time, deals well with this issue and
provides credible estimates. I show that there is very good covariate balance around
the threshold, and conduct a battery of robustness checks to assess the validity of
the empirical approach, including testing for pretrends in the outcomes of interests,
separate analyses for switches into and out of direct democracy, placebo tests at
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other population thresholds, and donut regressions following Barreca, Guldi, Lindo,
and Waddell (2011), in which observations for which the sorting is concentrated
are dropped. The results from these tests provide assurance of the validity of the
empirical strategy.
The main finding is that direct democracy reduces the size of government. In the
preferred specification, direct democracy reduces spending by almost 8%. Revenues
are decreased by a similar amount, and budget deficits are therefore equal under both
systems. I explain the results with a model, based on Besley and Coate (2008), that
I develop to combine common arguments from two different strands of the literature:
that direct democracy curbs special interest spending, and that it aligns policy with
the preferences of the median voter by issue unbundling. In the model, a majority
of the population (citizens) prefer low special-interest spending, but they care more
for some other dimension of policy. There is, however, a minority (special interests)
that want high spending and whose vote is determined by special-interest spending.
Under representative democracy, the two issues get bundled, as individuals have only
one vote (to elect a representative who will implement policy). The consequence is
that, even though the majority prefer low spending, parties propose high spending in
equilibrium to attract the votes of the special interests. As a result, special-interest
spending is high in representative democracy (independent of which candidate wins
the election). In contrast, in direct democracy, the two dimensions are unbundled, as
individuals vote separately on issues. In this case, the preferences of the median voter
prevail along the two dimensions, and this results in low special-interest spending.
Although the results can be explained by the the mechanism highlighted in this
model, I consider four other potential mechanisms: elite capture in direct democ-
racy, differential costs of participation in meetings and elections, direct democracy
directly affecting what policy individuals prefer, and municipalities in direct democ-
racy obtaining more transfers from upper-level governments. To shed light on their
plausibility, I present five additional sets of results. First, there are no partisan dif-
ferences in spending in representative democracy. This is consistent with the model,
which predicts that the two parties should converge to high spending. Second, ex-
penditures and revenues are equally volatile in direct and representative democracy.
This suggests that the costs of participation in meetings do not drive the results—if
that were the case, policy should be more volatile in direct democracy (Osborne,
Rosenthal, and Turner (2000)). Third, against a hypothesis of gradual learning, the
effects do not seem to change over time: they appear in the first term a municipal-
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ity works under direct democracy, and remain similar as municipalities spend more
time under direct democracy. Fourth, direct democracy does not affect subsequent
elections’ behavior (e.g., being exposed to participatory meetings does not lead to
more voter turnout in subsequent elections). Fifth, direct-democracy municipalities
do not obtain more transfers from upper-level governments. In light of this evidence,
and of the political and social characteristics of Spain, I conclude that, although it
is not possible to rule out completely that some of these mechanisms are at work,
the weight of the evidence indicates that they do not drive the results.
This paper contributes to the growing literature on the impact of political in-
stitutions on public policy (see, for example, Besley and Case (2003) and Persson
and Tabellini (2005)). More specifically, it expands our knowledge about the policy
implications of participatory institutions. As mentioned, these institutions are in-
creasingly used in villages across the world, and have been subject of recent work,
both theoretical and empirical. At the theory level, several papers have modeled
decision-making in meetings (Aragone`s and Sa´nchez-Page´s (2009), Osborne, Rosen-
thal, and Turner (2000), Turner and Weninger (2005)). At the empirical level, the
literature has worked on estimating the impact of participatory institutions on sev-
eral outcomes: for example, Besley, Pande, and Rao (2005) find that village meetings
in South India improved the targeting of welfare programs for the poor; Hinnerich
and Pettersson-Lidbom (2014) find that town meetings reduced welfare spending
in the context of Sweden in the 1920s and 30s; and Olken (2010), in a randomized
controlled trial, finds that the use of plebiscites improved voter satisfaction with
public policy in Indonesian villages. The present paper adds to that literature by
providing the first quasi-experimental evidence on how town meetings affect public
spending and taxation decisions in a contemporary setting.
This paper also contributes to the literature, pioneered by De Haan and Sturm
(1997) and Roubini and Sachs (1989), that analyzes how public budgets are shaped
by political institutions, and, in particular, by direct-democracy institutions. Evi-
dence from the US and Switzerland suggests that initiative and referendums reduce
public spending (see Matsusaka (1995) for the US, and Feld and Matsusaka (2003)
and Funk and Gathmann (2011) for Switzerland). Berry (2014), however, has re-
cently questioned the causal interpretation of the findings for the US, and Asatryan,
Baskaran, Grigoriadis, and Heinemann (2015) and Asatryan (2016) have found that
direct democracy at the local level increased expenditures in Germany. This pa-
per contributes to that literature by providing evidence from an unexplored setting,
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in which, unlike what happens in the aforementioned countries, the use of direct
democracy is determined by population size, therefore reducing endogeneity con-
cerns.
Finally, this paper expands the work that uses regression discontinuity designs
to estimate the effects of institutional rules on policy (for example, Bordignon, Nan-
nicini, and Tabellini (2016), Ferraz and Finan (2009), Fujiwara (2015), Gagliarducci,
Nannicini, and Naticchioni (2011), Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013), Hinnerich
and Pettersson-Lidbom (2014), and Pettersson-Lidbom (2012)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
framework. Section 3 provides background on the Spanish government systems. The
empirical strategy and the data are outlined in Sections 4 and 5. Section 6 presents
the main results. The robustness of the results is the focus of Section 7. Section 8
explores other potential mechanisms. Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 Theoretical Framework
Social scientists have long been interested in how switching from representative to
direct democracy might change policy. One strand of the literature argues that, in
representative democracy, an agency problem exists between voters and their elected
representatives due to free-rider problems in monitoring and disciplining officehold-
ers (Matsusaka (2005)). This gives elected officials leeway to pursue costly policies
that are not in the interests of their constituents, resulting in overspending. Frey
(1994) argues that a model that pictures politicians as forming a coalition against
taxpayers and voters seems to be an apt illustration of representative democracy. In
this view, the elected representatives are a well-defined group that jointly reaps rents
or cartelizes against the interests of citizens. Besley and Case (2003), in summariz-
ing this literature, conclude that “there is a widespread belief that agency problems
lead to a government that is too large” under representative democracy. The use of
direct-democracy institutions is a way to address this issue. By allowing people to
vote directly on policy, direct democracy gives them a way to circumvent represen-
tative institutions that may have been captured by elites or other special interests
and aligns policy with the preferences of the median voter (Matsusaka (2005)).
Another strand of the literature emphasizes that, under representative democ-
racy, citizens have only one vote to cast for candidates who have responsibility for
choosing a bundle of issues (Besley and Coate (2008)). This may lead to policies that
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are incongruent with the position favored by the median voter in some of the dimen-
sions. By unbundling issues, direct democracy allows the median voter’s preferences
to prevail along different dimensions.
I formalize these ideas in a simple model, adapted from Besley and Coate (2008),
that I summarize here and present in full in the Appendix. In the model, policy is
two-dimensional. There is a main ideological issue (henceforth, ideology) and a sec-
ondary issue (special-interest spending). Although the majority of individuals prefer
low (possibly zero) special-interest spending, there exists a minority that prefer high
spending, perhaps because they will benefit directly from it. The majority care more
about ideology but the minority care more about spending. Under representative
democracy, policy is implemented by a representative elected in an election between
two candidates, proposed by two political parties. Assuming the minority is suffi-
ciently large, in the unique equilibrium, both parties propose high special-interest
spending, against the wishes of the majority. In contrast, under direct democracy,
individuals vote separately on the ideological issue and on special-interest spending,
and the position favored by the median voter in each dimension is chosen. Direct
democracy, therefore, results in low special-interest spending, unlike what happens
under representative democracy.
The model, therefore, blends the points made by two different strands of the
literature: that direct democracy curbs special interest spending, and that it aligns
policy with the preferences of the median voter through the unbundling of issues.
In addition, the model predicts that spending in representative democracy should
not depend on which party is in office. In Section 6, I provide empirical evidence
that supports this additional prediction, and discuss other alternative mechanisms.
3 Institutional Background
In this section, I provide some institutional background and describe the two gov-
ernment systems that are used by Spanish municipalities. Spain is a very decen-
tralized country. It is politically divided into 17 regions, 50 provinces, and more
than 8,000 municipalities, which are administered by local governments. Local gov-
ernments spend 13% of the overall spending of the country (Gil-Ruiz Gil-Esparza
and Iglesias Quintana (2007)) and have substantial autonomy. National law (Local
Government Regulatory Law, Ley de Bases del Re´gimen Local) requires them to
provide a variety of services, including public lighting, waste collection, street clean-
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ing, road paving, household water supply, sewerage, access to villages, and food and
beverage control. In addition, they usually provide other services useful to the mu-
nicipality, such as organizing local festivities or providing tourist information. Local
governments can decide how much to spend on the required goods and services and
whether to provide additional goods and services. There is considerable variation
in expenditures across municipalities: The 90–10 ratio is 4.6.5
Local governments obtain their own revenues from taxes and fees: they can set
the tax rates—within certain limits imposed by national law—and the prices and
user fees of the goods and services that they provide. According to national law,
municipalities can impose five different taxes: property tax (impuesto de bienes
inmuebles), a tax on economic activities (impuesto de actividades econo´micas), a
motor vehicle tax (impuesto sobre los veh´ıculos de traccio´n meca´nica), a tax on
improvements to real property (impuesto de instalaciones, construcciones y obras),
and a tax on the increased value of urban land (impuesto sobre el incremento de
valor de los terrenos de naturaleza urbana).6 As happens with expenditures, there
is substantial variation in revenues across municipalities: The 90–10 ratio is 4.5.
In addition to these own expenditures and revenues, some expenditures are fi-
nanced through transfers from upper-level governments.7 Throughout the paper, I
focus on the municipalities’ own expenditures and revenues (that is, overall revenues
and expenditures net of transfers), as they are the ones that can be controlled by
local governments. In Section 8, I study if the amount of received transfers can drive
the results of the paper.
The Law on Budget Stability (Ley de Estabilidad Presupuestaria) states that
municipalities must have a balanced budget.8 However, no penalty is stipulated for
municipalities that fail to comply with the law. Indeed, there was a deficit in 39%
of the budgets in the sample, and in many cases a sizable one: for example, in 14%
of the budgets I observe a deficit of more than 3% of revenues (see the histogram of
5I calculate this number by taking the average value of expenditures by municipality over time
for those municipalities. This way, I do not use the cross-time variation, which would overstate the
variation in expenditures.
6 The first three are required taxes that national law forces municipalities to levy while the last
two are optional taxes. For both required and optional taxes, municipalities are free to set the tax
rates and, in some cases, introduce exemptions and deductions, within certain limits imposed by
national law. For example, for the most important tax, the property tax, they are allowed to set
the tax rate on urban land from 0.4 to 1.1% of the property value.
7Transfers account for approximately 46% of overall expenditures and revenues.
8In 2011, in the midst of the European debt crisis, the Constitution was amended to include
this principle.
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deficits in Appendix Figure A2).9 For this reason, it makes sense to test whether
direct democracy has an effect on deficits.
Municipalities must follow a government system that is determined by their pop-
ulation size one year before the local elections, which are held simultaneously in all
municipalities in the country every four years. Therefore, municipalities change the
government system at most once every four years. During the sample period (1988–
2011), municipalities with 100 or more inhabitants had to followed a representative-
democracy system, while those with fewer than 100 inhabitants followed a direct-
democracy system (called “open council”, or concejo abierto). Appendix Table A1
shows the number of direct-democracy municipalities covered in the sample, by
term. Between 603 and 827 municipalities operated under direct democracy, with
the number increasing over time as a consequence of the declining population of
small municipalities.
In the representative-democracy system, individuals elect a city council every
four years on local election day. The council elects a mayor among its members and
is entitled to approve the budget, decide on expenditures in various fields, control
the governing bodies, and to decide on the roll-call vote of confidence on the mayor.
The mayor chairs the meetings of the council, casts the decisive vote in the event of
a tie, heads the local police, and appoints mayoral deputies and cabinet members,
among other responsibilities. The size of the city council and the electoral rules
differ according to the population of the municipality. In particular, there is an
important change in the electoral system at 250 inhabitants.10 Municipalities below
that population size elect a council of five members in an open-list, plurality-at-large
election.11 To avoid dealing with multiple thresholds, and given that the estimation
will exploit municipalities with a population size close to the 100-inhabitant thresh-
old, throughout the paper I restrict the sample to municipalities with 250 or fewer
inhabitants.12
9Deficits can be financed by issuing debt or by reducing cash balances. The Law on Local Gov-
ernment Financing (Ley de Haciendas Locales) authorizes municipalities to issue debt, but with
some limits. For example, if the debt outstanding exceeds 110% of current revenues in the pre-
vious year, municipalities must ask for the authorization of the regional or national governments
and present a consolidation plan (see articles 48-55 of the (Ley de Haciendas Locales) for a com-
plete description of the requirements). However, that there was no penalty associated with those
regulations led many municipalities to not observe the law (Vila (2012)).
10Sanz (2015) studies the effects of that discontinuity on voter turnout.
11More specifically, political parties can present candidate lists of up to five candidates, and
voters can vote for up to four candidates from the same or different party lists. The five most-voted
candidates are elected members of the council.
12Also, I drop from the analysis the nine newly created municipalities as well as the municipalities
from which they seceded.
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In the direct-democracy system, the role of the city council is played through
open town meetings, so most relevant decisions, including the budget, must be
approved directly by individuals in a pure direct democracy framework.13 (In Ap-
pendix B, I describe the origins and the evolution in the application of this system.)
The specific working rules of the meetings may differ across municipalities, as the
law states that municipalities can work according to the local traditions. However,
national law (Real Decreto 2568/1986) provides some guidelines. Any individual el-
igible to vote (age 18+) may attend the meetings. The meetings are chaired by the
mayor, who is elected by first-past-the-post on local election day. Town meetings are
to be called on a Sunday or a holiday at least once every three months. A quorum
of one-third of the population is required. Citizens can delegate their vote to any
other citizen of the municipality, but no citizen can represent more than a third of
all individuals.14 Decisions are adopted by simple plurality rule. Data for atten-
dance are not publicly available, but I have collected data by hand from the minutes
of the meetings in one Spanish province.15 Average attendance in the sample was
11.6%. Taking vote delegation into account, the average share of represented voters
was 43.7%.
4 Data
Data for the public budgets and population size of municipalities are from the Span-
ish Ministry of Finance (Ministerio de Hacienda) and are publicly available for
73.6% of annual budgets.16 During the sample period, local elections were held
every four years from 1987 to 2011, so the data set covers six terms. Because local
elections are in May or June, the (possible) change in government system happens
13Figure 1 shows a meeting in the municipality of Madarcos, in the region of Madrid.
14The delegation of the vote must be written and can be for a specific meeting or permanent.
15The minutes of the meetings are stored in the archives of the regional administration. I collected
data from the province of Valladolid in the region of Castilla y Leo´n from the years 2006 and 2008.
Data on attendance were available for 31% (11/36) of municipalities, as attendance at the meetings
is recorded only if the secretary wishes to do so.
16Municipalities were required to report their budgets to the Ministry of Finance, which makes
them public. However, data from some budgets are missing because either they did not comply with
their obligations or because their data have not been digitized. A placebo test shows that direct
democracy does not have an effect on a dummy variable that indicates whether the observation is
available (see Appendix Table A8).
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halfway through the year. As spending and revenues are determined by the bud-
get approved at the end of the previous year, I assign election-year observations to
the previous term.17 Appedix Figure A1 provides a graphical representation of this
information.18
Table 1 shows the summary statistics. The first three variables are the main
outcomes: real expenditures per capita (Expenditures), real revenues per capita
(Revenues), and budget deficit (Deficit). To obtain the variables in real terms, I
divide the nominal variables by the GDP deflator.19 The deficit is the difference
between expenditures and revenues. The average municipality collects e647 per
capita per year in taxes and fees, and spends e671. Therefore, the average deficit
is e24 per capita per year. Appendix Figure A2 shows the histograms for these
variables. The next four variables, obtained from the Spanish Ministry of Interior
(Ministerio del Interior), are used to study the relevance of political parties in
driving the results. RW Mayor and LW Mayor are dummy variables that indicate
whether the mayor is from the main right-wing party (Popular Party, PP) or the
main left-wing party (Socialist Party, PSOE). With the sample restricted to those
elections in which these two were the two most-voted parties, the next variables
are the percent-point difference between the PP and the PSOE RW Difference,
and a dummy that indicates whether the PP was the most voted (so that a positive
(negative) value of RW Difference implies RW Winner = 1 (RW Winner = 0)). The
next six variables, provided by the National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional
de Estad´ıstica), are from national Congress electoral results, and are used to test
17In Spain, the fiscal year coincides with the calendar year, and budgets for year y are approved
in November or December of year y − 1.
18If expenditures and revenues are sticky, expenditures and revenues for municipality m at year y
are partially determined by the government system that municipality m followed in years before y.
When a municipality m switches systems, this implies that some of the expenditures and revenues
for year y may be determined by a government system that does not correspond to the government
system municipality m is following at that year. In general, this will make the estimated coefficients
closer to zero than in a scenario with no changes in government system. These considerations,
however, are not likely to play a significant role in practice. First, most expenditures and revenues
in small municipalities are decided on a year-to-year basis. For example, it is rare that they
incur in multi-year capital expenditures, unlike what happens in larger municipalities. It is true,
nonetheless, that other expenditures, such as personnel, could be more sticky. Second, if sticky
policies were playing a large role in the estimation, we should expect to see that the effects of direct
democracy on policy increase (in absolute value) over time, as municipalities spend more time in a
given system. However, I find that the effects of direct democracy on policy are already produced
in the first year that a municipality switches into direct democracy and do not vary significantly
over time (see Section 8).
19Data for the deflator are from the Spanish National Institute for Statistics.
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for covariate balance around the threshold. They are the shares of votes for the
three main parties in Spain—the right-wing PP (Votes Right), the left-wing PSOE
(Votes Left), and the far-left-wing United Left (Votes Far Left)—, the difference in
the share of votes for the two most-voted parties (Votes Difference), the percentage
of votes for the most-voted party (Votes Winner), and voter turnout (Turnout).20
The final six variables are demographic variables, which I also employ to study
covariate smoothness around the threshold, are the average age in the municipality
(Mean Age); the share of young (Young), middle-aged (Middle-Aged), and old (Old)
individuals; the share of immigrants (Immigrants); and the share of EU immigrants
over total immigrants (EU Immigrants).21
5 Empirical Strategy
A discontinuity in the density of population sizes is observed at the threshold (see
Figure 2).22 The shape of the discontinuity raises the concern that some munic-
ipalities self-select into representative democracy, and that, as a result, direct-
and representative-democracy municipalities differ in other characteristics that may
themselves affect policy. I take this issue seriously. First, I will discuss why and
how the sorting around the threshold arises, and then I will explain how I deal with
this issue in the empirical approach.23
In Spain, the official population size of a municipality is given by the number
of citizens who are registered in the municipal registry (padro´n municipal). Mu-
nicipalities keep track of all the variations in the population in the public registry
and report periodically the data to the National Statistics Institute (INE). The INE
validates the information it receives, checking that there is no fraud—for example,
20Some election variable files are missing from the official files, and, for this reason, the number
of observations is lower than for the budget and population variables. In addition, the sample size
is smaller for Votes Far Left because the United Left did not run in some regions in some elections.
See Appendix C for a precise definition of the election variables.
21The precise definition of these variables is in Appendix C. They are available only from 1996.
Also note that, in municipalities with no immigrants, the share of EU immigrants is missing by
construction. For this reason, the number of observations is lower for EU Immigrants.
22The discontinuity is significant at the 1% level, according to McCrary (2008)’s test.
23Sorting in regression discontinuity designs that use population thresholds is studied in depth
by Eggers, Freier, Grembi, and Nannicini (2015), who provide evidence that sorting also exists in
France, Germany, and Italy. They also argue that, even when extensive strategic sorting is taking
place, a regression discontinuity design “may still be an attractive approach to studying policy
effects; after all, the alternative is to study settings where all political units (not just those that are
able to manipulate their population figures) choose which policies to adopt”.
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it ensures that, for every registration, there is a corresponding unregistration in an-
other municipality—and, yearly, makes the final population figures public. While
this system makes it difficult to imagine that there is direct fraud or manipulation
of population figures, sorting around the threshold can appear as mayors (or other
local politicians) persuade some individuals to register in the municipality, with the
goal of reaching the population threshold and falling into representative democracy.
This is facilitated by the fact that individuals who have dwellings in more than one
municipality can, in practice, decide in which of them to register: Although individ-
uals are required to register in the municipality in which they spend the most time,
this requirement is almost impossible to monitor and is not enforced in practice.
Naturally, the question is why politicians would prefer to be under representative
democracy. There are at least three possible reasons. One is that representative
democracy is easier to operate, as it does not require calling town meetings to adopt
decisions.24 A second possible reason is that there are five political positions in
representative democracy (the five city councilors), but only one in direct democracy
(the mayor). Although, in most cases, these positions are not remunerated, people
may still derive non-monetary benefits for holding them. Finally, following the logic
of the model presented in Section 2, if the mayor is a special interest, he or she will
prefer to be under representative democracy as a means to implement his or her
preferred policy.25
While the existence of sorting is certainly an issue that requires close attention, it
does not imply, by itself, that the estimates will be biased. In his canonical work on
sorting, McCrary (2008) explains that there may be a discontinuity in the running
variable even when there is no failure of identification, so that a continuous density
is not necessary (or sufficient) for identification, except under auxiliary assumptions.
24Conversations with mayors and other local government officials make me think that this is
probably the most relevant reason.
25Of course, if the mayor is a citizen instead of a special interest, he or she will prefer direct
democracy. This raises the theoretical possibility of two-way sorting. Although it is not possible
to directly test for the existence of two-way sorting, I believe that sorting into direct democracy
is negligible. First, as mentioned, mayors and local government officials indicate that the main
reason for sorting is the first, i.e., that representative democracy is easier to operate. Second, it is
hard to conceive local government officials trying to persuade people to go to register in another
municipality. Also, note that the empirical approach and the robustness checks to assess the validity
of the strategy, in particular the donut regressions, do not depend on the sorting being one-way.
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Outcomemyt = β˜DirDemmt + f(Populationmt − 100) + u˜myt, (1)
where Outcomemyt is the outcome of interest in municipality m at year y in term t,
DirDemmt is the treatment dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if municipality
m follows direct democracy in term t and 0 otherwise, Populationmt is the assignment
variable (population one year before the local elections), f is a smooth function of
the assignment variable, and umyt is an error term. The parameter of interest is β˜.
The results from estimating Equation (1) show a reduction of expenditures and
revenues in direct democracy (see Appendix Table A2). However, there are some
concerns about the validity of this approach. In particular, there is some covariate
imbalance (Table A3) and evidence of a pretrend in the outcomes of interest (Table
A4).
Next, to deal with these issues, I consider a regression discontinuity design
extended with fixed effects. I find that this strategy yields credible estimates of
the treatment effects, and use it as the main specification throughout the paper.26
Specifically, I consider the following estimating equation:
Outcomemyt = αm + γy + βDirDemmt + f(Populationmt − 100) + umyt, (2)
where αm is a municipality fixed effect and γy is a year fixed effect.
Identification is therefore based on switches in government system, of which there
are 513 in the sample (see Appendix Table A1).27 The identification assumption
is that the characteristics that make a municipality more likely to sort across the
threshold are not correlated with other characteristics that affect policy, conditional
on the fixed effects. This implies that it is the timing of the sorting that matters.
26An empirical strategy that combines regression discontinuity and fixed effects is also followed
by Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) and Corbi, Papaioannou, and Surico (2014). Other papers that use
related strategies that combine the cross-sectional discontinuity and the longitudinal structure of
the data are ?) Campa (2011), Casas-Arce and Saiz (2015), Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein (2010)
Deshpande (2014), Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2012), Lemieux and Milligan (2008).
27Most of these switches (379) are from representative to direct democracy, as there is a general
trend of a falling population in small Spanish municipalities. As a result, the empirical strategy
is based mainly on these switches instead of on switches out of direct democracy, which are more
suspicious, given the shape of the sorting. In Section 7, I show the results of the estimation based
on considering the two types of switches separately.
I start by considering a standard regression-discontinuity design framework:
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For example, suppose that the whole sorting process is driven by local government
officials who are very good at persuading individuals to register. A violation of the
identification assumption would not be that local government officials’ characteris-
tics are correlated with other factors that affect policy but, rather, that the precise
period in which the sorting is achieved coincides with a change in those other factors.
Although the identification assumption is, of course, not directly testable, I
perform five sets of tests to assess the validity of this empirical approach, following
previous research that has dealt with similar situations (Pettersson-Lidbom (2012),
Barreca, Guldi, Lindo, and Waddell (2011)). First, I check if (conditional on the
fixed effects) municipalities at each side of the threshold are similar in other time-
varying variables that may have an effect on the outcomes of interest. Second, I test
if there is an effect on the outcomes at the previous period, and if the results are
robust to including municipality-specific trends. Third, I test whether the effect is
similar in municipalities that switch into direct democracy and in those that switch
out of direct democracy. Finding that the effect is similar would reinforce the
credibility of the estimates, as it would be difficult to explain that correlation from
some omitted factor. Fourth, I conduct placebo tests at other (artificial) population
thresholds. Fifth, I consider donut regressions, following Barreca, Guldi, Lindo, and
Waddell (2011). In this test, observations very close to the threshold, where self-
selection is concentrated, are dropped from the analysis. The results from all these
tests provide assurance of the validity of the empirical strategy.
I use nonparametric local linear regressions to estimate Equation (2), as sug-
gested by Hahn and der Klaauw (2001), Porter (2003) and Gelman and Imbens
(2014). A key ingredient to this approach is the bandwidth. A larger bandwidth
increases the efficiency of the estimation at the cost of more bias. I choose a base-
line bandwidth according to the procedure suggested by Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012) and provide the results at different fractions of that bandwidth.28 I use a
rectangular kernel, as recommended by Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Lee and
Lemieux (2010). This is equivalent to estimating standard linear regressions over
the interval of the selected bandwidth on both sides of the cutoff point. I clus-
ter standard errors at the municipality level (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan
(2004)). Because the running variable is discrete, I also cluster standard errors at
the running variable, as recommended by Lee and Card (2008). Therefore, I follow
28The results are very similar if I use the optimal bandwidth suggested by Calonico, Cattaneo,
and Titiunik (2014). This method selects slightly smaller bandwidths.
a multi-clustering approach (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011)).29
29The results are very similar if standard errors are clustered just by municipality.
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6 Main Results: Effect of Direct Democracy on the Size
of Government
This section presents the main results of the paper. Additional results will be dis-
cussed in Section 8 to shed light on the mechanisms. Table 2 presents the estimates
of the impact of direct democracy on the public finances of local governments. The
table shows the results of estimating Equation (2), with the log of Expenditures,
the log of Revenues, and Deficit as the outcomes. A graphical representation of the
results is shown in Figure 3.30
I find evidence of an effect of direct democracy on public expenditures (Panel A
of Table 2). Under the preferred specification (Column 1), which uses the bandwidth
from Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012), direct democracy reduces public spending
by almost 8%, and the effect is significant at the 1% level. On average, municipalities
just to the right of the threshold (100 inhabitants) spend e709 per capita; thus, the
effect is equivalent to a decrease of e57 per capita.31 Next, I study robustness to
bandwidth choice and alternative specifications. Columns 2 and 3 show the results
for 50% and 150% of the optimal bandwidth (Appendix Figure A3 displays the
results graphically for a wide range of bandwidths). Columns 4 to 6 show that the
results are robust to fitting high-order polynomials to the whole sample. Finally, as
shown in Column 7, the results are also robust to an alternative specification that
includes municipality-specific time trends. This specification will be discussed in
more detail in the next section.
Panels B and C of Table 2 concern whether the differences in public spending go
together with a change in revenues or whether they are created by different deficits.
According to the preferred specification (Column 2), direct democracy reduces rev-
30To present a graphical representation that incorporates the fixed effects and, therefore, matches
the estimated equation, I estimate Outcomemyt = αm + γy +
100+OBW∑
j=100−OBW
δjPopulationj ,mt) + umyt
using the observations within the optimal bandwidth for Outcomemyt , where Populationj ,mt is a
dummy that indicates whether municipality m has population size j at term t. Then, in the y-axis,
I plot the estimated coefficients δˆj . I normalize the coefficients so that the average bin immediately
to the right of the threshold takes the value of zero.
31Because the outcome variable is the log of expenditures, the exact percent effect on expenditures
is 100 ∗ (exp(−0.0377)− 1) = −7.688 (Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980)).
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enues by 5%, and the effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. The rest of
the columns and Figure A3 show that the results are robust to different bandwidths
and specifications. Finally, the results for deficits (Panel C) are close to zero and
not significant under any specification. Therefore, the evidence indicates that di-
rect democracy reduces expenditures and revenues by a similar amount, without
affecting budget deficits.
7 Robustness
In this section, I present five robustness checks to assess the validity of the empirical
strategy: placebo tests to study covariate balance at the threshold, placebo tests for
pretrends in the outcomes of interest, placebo tests at other (artificial) population
thresholds, separate analyses for municipalities that switch into and out of direct
democracy, and donut regressions. In the Appendix, I show additional robustness
checks to study whether the results change when top-coding outliers (Table A7) and
whether the number of missing observations changes at the threshold (Table A8).
7.1 Covariate Smoothness
I study covariate smoothness around the threshold by performing placebo tests:
I estimate Equation (2) with a variety of political and demographic variables as
outcomes. If the empirical strategy is valid, there should be no effect of direct
democracy on these variables.
A possible concern is that municipalities that switch into direct democracy do a
more conservative policy only because they are becoming more ideologically conser-
vative. To test for this, I exploit data from national Congress elections. These data
are especially suited for this purpose because, although results are reported at the
municipality level, the electoral district is at the province level and, therefore, the
100-inhabitant threshold does not play any role in the elections. Further, Congress
elections are the most important elections in Spain, and turnout is high (78% in
the average municipality during the sample period); thus, they are likely to capture
political differences across municipalities.32 I estimate Equation (2) with previous
elections’ variables as the outcomes. For year y in term t, I consider Congress elec-
tions held during the previous term t− 1. In particular, I use the share of votes for
32Spain is a parliamentary democracy, so there are no direct elections for the executive branch.
Citizens elect the Congress, which, in turn, elects the Prime Minister.
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the three main political parties—the right-wing PP (Votes Rightm,t−1), the left-wing
PSOE (Votes Leftm,t−1), and the far-left-wing United Left (Votes Far Leftm,t−1)—,
the difference in the share of votes for the two most-voted parties and the share
of votes for the most-voted party (Votes Differencem,t−1, and Votes Winnerm,t−1),
which give a measure of how politically polarized the municipality is, and voter
turnout (Turnoutm,t−1), which has been shown to correlate with variables that also
may affect people’s preferences toward economic policy, such as age, education, or
income (Blais and Achen (2010), Matsusaka and Palda (1999)).33 Next, I study co-
variate smoothness in demographic variables: average age in the municipality (Mean
Age); the share of young (Young), middle-aged (Middle-Aged), and old (Old) in-
dividuals; the share of immigrants (Immigrants); and the share of EU immigrants
over total immigrants (EU Immigrants). These variables will capture how economic
conditions are evolving, as immigrants are more likely to locate in booming munic-
ipalities.
The results from these tests are shown Table 3 and represented graphically in
Figure 4. All of the variables are smooth at the threshold, with no coefficient being
significant at even the 10% level. This provides assurance about the validity of the
empirical strategy, as it indicates that, conditional on the fixed effects, municipalities
at both sides of the threshold are similar in a variety of political and demographic
variables.
7.2 Pretrends in the Outcomes of Interest
In this section, I exploit the longitudinal dimension of the data to test for pretrends
in the outcomes of interest. First, I lag the outcome variables four years (so that
they correspond to the outcomes at the same year of the previous term) and perform
placebo tests by estimating Equation (2) with these lagged variables as outcomes.
Finding a discontinuity in the contemporaneous outcome but not in the lagged
one would be a strong piece of evidence supporting the validity of the regression
discontinuity design (Lee and Lemieux (2010)). The results of these tests are shown
in Table 4 and Appendix Figure A4. The coefficients in Table 4 are starkly different
to those that show the contemporaneous effect shown in Table 2, and show that
there is no effect of direct democracy on the previous term’s expenditures, revenues
and deficit.
33The rest of the parties with representation in Congress during the entire period are regional
parties that do not run in the whole country.
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An alternative check on the identification strategy is to add municipality-specific
time trends to the main specification. In particular, I consider:
Outcomemyt = α0m + α1mt + γy +
˜˜
βDirDemmt + f(Populationmt − 100) + ˜˜umyt, (3)
where α0m is a municipality-specific intercept, as before, and α1mt is a municipality
coefficient multiplying the time-trend variable, y. The last column of Table 2 shows
that the results are robust to this alternative specification, with direct democracy
reducing expenditures and revenues by approximately 5% (results significant at the
10% and 5% levels, respectively).
The results in this section appease the concern that municipalities that switch
systems in a given direction were conducting different policies than the rest before
the switch. In particular, one concern would be that mayors would try to cross the
threshold by using taxes or public spending to attract people to the municipality.
If this happened, we should see an effect of direct democracy this term on taxes or
spending in the previous term. The results rule out this possibility.
7.3 Switches into and out of Direct Democracy
The preferred specification is based on switches in the government system. Given
the sorting process and the shape of the density of population sizes, which suggests a
preference for representative democracy, one concern is that the results are driven by
time-varying omitted variables associated with a switch from direct to representative
democracy. I study whether this is the case by performing two separate regressions.
I first base the estimation on switches into direct democracy and exclude from the
sample the municipality-years that correspond to terms in which a municipality
switched out of direct into representative democracy. I then estimate Equation
(2) with the restricted sample. Next, I do the reverse and drop the municipality-
years that correspond to switches out of direct into representative democracy. If
the results from these two different samples point to a reduction in expenditures
and revenues, that would reinforce the credibility of the estimates, as it would be
difficult to explain that correlation by some omitted factor.
Appendix Table A5 shows the results. For expenditures, the preferred specifica-
tion for switches into direct democracy yields a point estimate of -6.4% (significant
at the 5% level), and the one for switches out of direct democracy, -13.1% (sig-
nificant at the 1% level). The results for revenues also tend to support the main
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findings. In switches into direct democracy, direct democracy reduces revenues by
4.2% in the preferred specification—the effect is not significant, but it is significant
at the 5% level at both 50% and 150% of that bandwidth. In switches out of direct
democracy, the effect is -8.4% (significant at 10%). Finally, the results for deficits
are mostly insignificant in the two different subsamples.
7.4 Placebo Tests at Other Population Thresholds
In this section I conduct placebo tests by estimating the effect of crossing population
thresholds that are irrelevant (e.g., the effect of having more than 115 inhabitants).
Specifically, I create placebo treatments at all other population sizes from 30 to 220
inhabitants, by defining dummies that indicate if the population of a municipality-
year is above or below a given population size.34 I then run equation (2) with
every placebo treatment (so I run 190 regressions per outcome variable). If the
effect of direct democracy has an actual causal effect, then the estimate of direct
democracy on policy, based on the 100-inhabitant threshold, should be an outlier in
the distribution of placebo coefficients.
I show the results from these tests in Figure 5. I show the empirical cumulative
distribution function of point estimates and t-statistics for the 190 regressions con-
sidered for each variable. I also show the implied p-values, which are the share of
placebo regressions in which I obtain a point estimate (or t-statistic) that is larger
in absolute value than the one for the true threshold. For expenditures, the im-
plied p-value is 0.036 for point estimates, and 0.01 for t-statistics. For revenues, the
p-values are 0.126 and 0.068, respectively and, for deficits, 0.405 and 0.242.
These tests specifically address the concern that the bandwidths used in the main
specifications are inadequate and lead to artificially significant effects.35 However,
if that were the case, then we should see similarly large effects at other thresholds.
These tests show that this is not the case.
34Below 30 (above 220) inhabitants the effects become very imprecisely estimated as there are
few observations below (above) that population size—as explained in Section 4, at 250 inhabitants
there is another threshold, so I focus on population sizes below that threshold to avoid confounding
effects.
35For example, it could be argued that the bandwidths used are too large. Even though I calculate
the optimal bandwidth following the standard procedure by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and
show the results at different fractions of that bandwidth, precision considerations might lead the
procedure to select bandwidths that are too large.
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7.5 Donut Regressions
This section considers donut regressions in the spirit of Barreca, Guldi, Lindo, and
Waddell (2011). These regressions exclude from the estimation observations that
are very close to the threshold, where most of the sorting is concentrated. Given
the nature of the sorting process, it is likely that most of the self-selection of mu-
nicipalities into representative democracy is concentrated in a small window around
the threshold. It does not seem plausible that the population size of municipalities
that are self-selecting is much larger than what is strictly necessary to be above
the threshold or that municipalities with a population size far below the threshold
attempt to cross it.36 Thus, finding a similar effect when municipalities very close
to the threshold are excluded would reinforce the credibility of the estimates.
For each outcome variable, I consider six regressions. The first one is the bench-
mark regression. The second excludes observations within a 1% interval around the
threshold (that is, municipalities with 99 and 100 inhabitants), the third excludes
those within an interval of 2%, and so on, until the sixth regression, which excludes
5%. Appendix Table A6 shows these results. It is reassuring that, in line with the
baseline specification, all of the point estimates imply a reduction in expenditures
and revenues, ranging from 4 to 7% in expenditures, and from 1 to 4% in revenues,
while the estimates for deficits remain close to zero. The results, however, are for the
most part not statistically significant, due to a considerable increase in the standard
errors. For example, excluding 5 inhabitants yields a point estimate almost identical
to the baseline (-0.072 versus -0.079, respectively), while almost doubling the stan-
dard error (0.049 versus 0.026). Therefore, it is safe to conclude that the baseline
results are not exclusively driven by the observations very close of the threshold, in
which the sorting could be more worrisome.
8 Mechanisms
In this section, I dig into the mechanisms that may drive the results documented
so far. I start by testing an additional prediction of the model outlined in Section
36For example, a municipality that would have “naturally” had 97 inhabitants may well end
up having 103 inhabitants if enough individuals are willing to register so that their municipality
is above the threshold. However, it is unlikely that this municipality would end up having 115
inhabitants. Likewise, it is unlikely that a municipality with a population far below the threshold
would alter its population to reach the threshold: If individuals know that the population is far
from getting the desired system, they will not even attempt to reach it.
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2. Then, I examine four other potential mechanisms, and discuss their plausibility
in light of several additional results and the political and social circumstances in
Spain.
Effects of Political Parties on Policy
The model presented in Section 2 predicts that, under representative democracy,
the two parties converge to high spending. Therefore, we should not see differences
in spending across parties. Here I test whether that prediction is supported by the
data. Although this, by no means, pretends to be a definite test of the validity of
the model, it would be reassuring to find that policy does not differ across parties.
Conversely, finding that it does would raise concerns about the applicability of the
model to the Spanish case.
To test this, I replicate the analysis in Arenas and Bagu¨e´s (2015) and consider
(representative-democracy) elections in which the right-wing PP and the left-wing
PSOE were the two most-voted parties. I perform a fuzzy regression discontinuity
design, in which the running variable is the difference in the percentage of votes for
the PP and the PSOE (RW Difference) and the treatment variable is having a PP
mayor (RW Mayor).37 Thus, when the running variable is positive (negative), the
most-voted party (RW Winner) is the PP (PSOE). More formally, I estimate:
Outcomemyt = δ + κRWMayormt + g(RWDifferencemt) + myt,
RWMayormyt = δ˜ + κ˜RWWinnermt + g˜(RWDifferencemt) + ˜myt, (4)
where the coefficient of interest is κ. I estimate this equation by local linear re-
gression, and I cluster standard errors at the municipality level. Tests for covariate
balance and manipulation of the running variable RW Difference, shown in Table
A10 and Figure A6 in the Appendix, provide assurance that this is a valid empirical
approach.
The first stage is strong. As shown in Panel A of Appendix Table A9, being the
most-voted party increases the probability of obtaining the mayor by 55 percentage
points.38 Panels B to D in Appendix Table A9 show the estimated coefficients of
37One caveat to this approach is that, to obtain precise estimates, I need to use all municipalities
under representative democracy, not only those close to the threshold as in the main results.
38There are two forces behind this strong first stage: one is that the most voted party is more
likely to have one more seat in the council, thus normally increasing its bargaining power to appoint
the mayor; the second is that, even in cases in which the two most voted parties tie in seats, the
most voted party is—surpisingly— much more likely to appoint the mayor. This phenomenon is
studied in depth by Fujiwara and Sanz (2016).
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interest κˆ, and Appendix Figure A5 provides a graphical representation of the first-
stage and reduced-form results. There is no evidence of differences in expenditures
and revenues between PP and PSOE mayors, as the effects are close to zero and
mostly insignificant. For deficits, the results seem to suggest that right-wing mayors
may reduce it, but the effects become insignificant with alternative specifications.39
These results suggest that the increased spending in representative democracy
comes from both parties, as predicted by the model. A similar analysis can be
done for direct-democracy municipalities, in which there is also a mayor. In the
model, political parties play no role in direct democracy, so spending and revenues
should not depend on the affiliation of the mayor, just as we showed it is the case
under representative democracy. The results, shown in Appendix Table A11, reveal
no significant differences in policy across parties.40 However, the results are very
imprecise due to the lack of observations with sufficiently close elections in direct
democracy.
Alternative Mechanisms
(a) Direct democracy may be more prone to elite capture, as was recently proposed
by Hinnerich and Pettersson-Lidbom (2014). An elite who prefers low spending
may exert more influence under direct democracy than in a representative democracy
setting. Hinnerich and Pettersson-Lidbom (2014) provide three arguments that may
show that this was a likely situation in the case studied (Sweden at the beginning
of the 20th century). First, the lack of political parties in direct democracy made it
more difficult for the citizens to solve their collective action problems (e.g., Acemoglu
and Robinson (2008)). Second, the chairman of the town meeting, often a member
of the elite, had substantial power to set the agenda. Third, many decisions at
meetings were taken by an open vote, and there was the potential for intimidation
by the elite.
Although Hinnerich and Pettersson-Lidbom (2014) present compelling evidence
in favor of this mechanism in the case that they study, there are several reasons to
39These results replicate the findings by Arenas and Bagu¨e´s (2015) for Spain and are in line with
the findings of Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) for United States cities.
40Given that these are first-past-the-post elections, where the most voted candidate automatically
becomes mayor, this is pure (not fuzzy) regression discontinuity.
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doubt that it is relevant in the setting explored in this paper. First, their argument
is based on a context with a conflict between the landed local elite (e.g., farmers)
and citizens (e.g., the agricultural workers) at the time when Sweden was still a
poor, mostly agrarian society. Thus, the landed elite would like to keep the old
labor-repressive economic system, while the citizens would like to have an economic
system based on wage labor. This type of situation is not at all present in contem-
porary Spain. Second, it is not obvious how the elite could capture the meetings in
the Spanish setting. The first two reasons that Hinnerich and Pettersson-Lidbom
(2014) provided for Sweden do not apply: There are political parties under direct
democracy, and the meetings are mostly deliberative, and, therefore, the agenda-
setting power of the mayor is limited. Finally, although it is the case that many
decisions are taken by an open vote and the possibility of intimidation cannot be
completely ruled out, conversations with mayors and other local officials make me
think that intimidation is not an issue in Spanish town meetings. Third, it is not
obvious why the elite would want a smaller local government. Gobernado Rebaque
(2003) shows that fiscal policy is only very slightly progressive at the local level;
even though some expenditures are progressive, this is almost totally offset by the
regresiveness of local taxes.41 Alternatively, if we think of the elite that would want
to capture the meetings as the special interests of the model, then the elite would
prefer a larger government, which is not consistent with the results.
(b) The differences in policy may be driven by costs of participation. An alter-
native model for direct democracy is developed by Osborne, Rosenthal, and Turner
(2000). In this model, individuals decide whether to participate, at a cost, in a
meeting whose outcome is a compromise among the participants’ favorite positions.
In deciding whether to participate, each person compares the cost of participation
with the impact of his or her presence on the compromise. One prediction of the
model is that the outcome will be extremely volatile: in the presence of even a
small amount of randomness, the equilibrium outcome may vary dramatically.42
41A caveat is that Gobernado Rebaque (2003) studies only large municipalities. However, it is
likely that the overall system is even more regressive in smaller towns; while the regresiveness of
the taxes (mainly the property tax) applies to both, the progressive expenditures singled out by
Gobernado Rebaque (2003) (for example, public transportation) have a very limited role in small
municipalities.
42One source of such randomness is the players’ behavior in a mixed-strategy equilibrium. An-
other source of randomness is exogenous, and arises in a model in which each player is prevented
from attending the meeting with some positive probability.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 30 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1709
to Osborne, Rosenthal, and Turner (2000), policy will be more variable than in a
representative-democracy setting.43
To shed light on the plausibility of this mechanism, I estimate the effect of direct
democracy on the variability of policy. I proceed in two steps.44 First, I estimate
Equation (2) and obtain the residuals. Second, I estimate Equation (2) letting the
outcome variable be the absolute value of the residuals obtained in the previous
step. The coefficient for DirDem from this second stage captures the effect of direct
democracy on the variability of the outcome.
The results, shown in Appendix Table A12, suggest that there is no effect of
direct democracy on the variability of expenditures or revenues (or, if anything,
that direct democracy leads to less variability). In the main specification, direct
democracy leads to expenditures that deviate from the predicted values around
four percentage points less than in representative democracy. However, the results
become insignificant and closer to zero with other bandwidths or polynomials. For
revenues and deficits, the results are even more clear in pointing to a null effect.
The results are similar if, instead of the absolute value of the residuals, I consider
the squared residuals, the log of the absolute value of the residuals, or the log of
the squared residuals. Therefore, the evidence indicates that, contrary to Osborne,
Rosenthal, and Turner (2000), policy is not more volatile in direct democracy.
(c) Direct democracy may affect the policy that individuals prefer. For example,
the deliberative nature of the meetings may allow citizens to learn by aggregat-
ing information, or it may make the drawbacks of some public expenditures more
salient.45
Although it is not possible to provide a definitive test for this mechanism, I
conduct two tests that can be helpful in assessing its plausibility. First, if the
effects of direct democracy on policy were driven by citizens’ gradual learning from
participating in town meetings, we should observe that the effects grow over time as
municipalities spend more time under direct democracy. Here I test whether that
43Of course, this depends on the mechanics of the representative-democracy system, but none of
the standard models would predict such big variability.
44Eggers, Freier, Grembi, and Nannicini (2015) follows a similar procedure.
45Thus, we may see different policies even if the median voter theorem holds in both representative
and direct democracy and even if there are no previous differences in policy preferences between the
citizens who participate in direct and representative democracy. Under this scenario, differences in
policy arise because direct democracy brings about a shift in the median voter’s optimal point.
Therefore, it is reasonable to predict that, if direct democracy behaves according
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Nj,mtfj(Populationmt − 100) + βjNj,mtDirDemmt
]
+ umyt, (5)
where Nj,mt is a dummy variable that indicates how many terms municipality m
at year y has been under direct democracy. For a municipality in its first term,
N1,mt = 1 and Nj,mt = 0 for j = 1 and, analogously, for a municipality in its second
or third terms. For a municipality in its fourth or longer term, N4,mt = 1 and
Nj,mt = 0 for all j = 4.46 Therefore, β captures the effect of direct democracy in
the first term under direct democracy, and the βj ’s indicate how the effect varies in
subsequent terms.47
The results are shown in Appendix Table A13. For expenditures, the coefficient
onDirDemmt under the optimal bandwidth is -6.3% and significant at the 10% level,
indicating that direct democracy reduces expenditures in the first term. The results
are also significant for other bandwidths (Columns 2 and 3). For N2,mtDirDemmt ,
N3,mtDirDemmt and N4,mtDirDemmt , the coefficients are not significant, suggesting
that the effect does not vary over time. It is true, however, that, due to the short
length of the panel, the estimates are not very precise, so learning cannot be com-
pletely ruled out. A similar pattern appears in the estimation for revenues. For
deficits, neither the coefficient on DirDemmt nor the interaction terms are signifi-
cant.
Second, I ask the following questions: How does being in direct democracy affect
voter behavior in subsequent elections? Does being in this participatory system lead
to more voter turnout? Does it benefit right or left-wing parties? For example,
if the frequent deliberation in town meetings makes individuals more engaged in
46I consider consecutive terms, so a municipality m that switches out of direct democracy and
switches back into direct democracy at term t has N1,mt = 1 at t. A caveat is that I cannot observe
whether a municipality followed direct democracy before the sample period starts, as only munici-
palities of fewer than 25 (as opposed to 100) inhabitants were required to follow direct democracy
before 1987. Larger municipalities could choose between the two systems. My understanding,
based on conversations with local government officials, is that very few municipalities opted for
direct democracy. Thus, I assume that, for municipalities under direct democracy in the first term
t = 1, N1,m1 = 1.
47I cannot rule out the possibility that town meetings affect people’s preferences in shorter periods
of time. For example, attending merely one meeting might make individuals change their minds
about policy, thus driving the results.
is the case, by considering this equation:
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 32 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1709
the democratic process, we should expect that voter turnout increases in elections
after a municipality switches into direct democracy. In addition to being important
questions in themselves, they can indirectly shed light on whether being under direct
democracy affects individuals’ preferences.
To answer these questions, I test whether being under direct democracy on
term t has an effect on national elections after the beginning of term t—during
period t itself (VotesRightm,t, VotesLeftm,t, VotesFarLeftm,t, Turnoutm,t), and in
the subsequent period t + 1 (VotesRightm,t+1, VotesLeftm,t+1, VotesFarLeftm,t+1,
Turnoutm,t+1)—by estimating Equation (2) with those variables as outcomes. The
results show that there is no effect on any of the outcomes (see Appendix Table
A14). All the coefficients are very close to zero and not significant at conventional
levels.
(d) The differences may be driven by the amount of transfers received from
upper-level governments. In particular, if municipalities in direct democracy have
more projects financed through these transfers, that could explain why they decide
to set lower taxes and fees and spend less. Although some transfers are determined
as a function of population and cannot jump at the threshold, others can, as they are
given at will by provincial and regional governments.48 If direct-democracy munic-
ipalities are better at “lobbying” for these transfers, or if upper-level governments
prefer to fund direct-democracy municipalities, that could lead to more transfers
under direct democracy. It is not clear why we should expect this to happen, but I
can anyway directly test it in the data, by estimating whether there is an effect of
direct democracy on transfers received. In Appendix Table A15, I show the results
of estimating Equation (2) with the log of Transfers as the dependent variable. All
the estimates are insignificant and very close to zero, indicating that there is no
effect of the treatment on transfers. Therefore, it is unlikely that this mechanism
can be driving the results.
48For example, Curto-Grau, Sole´-Olle´, and Sorribas-Navarro (2015) show that regional govern-
ments give more transfers to municipalities that are politically aligned.
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Compared with a standard representative-democracy system, direct democracy re-
duces public spending by almost 8%. Revenues are reduced by a similar amount,
thus leaving budget deficits unchanged.
This paper expands our knowledge of the impact of participatory institutions,
by providing the first quasi-experimental evidence on how town meetings affect
spending and taxation decisions in a contemporary setting. Of course, research
from other settings is needed to get a more complete understanding of this issue.
Finally, this paper opens up an interesting avenue for future work, which is to
use this previously unexplored setting to study how other outcomes—for example,
corruption—are affected by the use of participatory meetings.
9 Conclusion
This paper has provided empirical evidence on the effects of direct democracy on
policy. Using a regression discontinuity design in the context of Spanish local gov-
ernments, I have shown that direct democracy results in a smaller government.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
mean sd p1 p50 p99 count
Expenditures (e per cap.) 671.0 1321.9 74.5 460.1 3524.6 42162
Revenues (e per cap.) 647.3 1290.3 87.9 449.3 3375.5 42162
Deficit (e per cap.) 23.8 270.8 -272.3 0.0 875.4 42162
RW Mayor 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0 1.0 42073
LW Mayor 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 1.0 42073
RW Winner 0.6 0.5 0.0 1.0 1.0 19807
RW Difference (%) 12.4 41.6 -90.0 13.7 96.2 19807
Votes Right (%) 51.6 21.1 2.1 54.1 92.2 42056
Votes Left (%) 30.6 15.5 0.0 29.7 69.4 42056
Votes Far Left (%) 3.2 3.7 0.0 2.2 17.1 35095
Votes Difference (%) 31.0 21.8 0.0 27.5 87.5 42056
Votes Winner (%) 59.3 13.2 32.7 57.9 92.3 42056
Turnout (%) 78.3 8.8 52.9 79.3 95.5 42056
Mean Age (years) 53.0 6.1 39.3 53.0 67.7 27582
Young (%) 9.2 5.5 0.0 8.9 23.4 27582
Middle-Aged (%) 53.4 9.2 29.2 53.6 74.6 27582
Old (%) 37.3 11.6 12.9 37.0 67.9 27582
Immigrants (%) 2.6 4.8 0.0 0.5 22.4 27569
EU Immigrants (%) 45.4 42.1 0.0 41.7 100.0 14338
Population (inhabitants) 130.9 62.4 19.0 128.0 247.0 42162
The unit of observation is a municipality-year. The sample size is smaller for election variables
because some data are missing from the official files. The sample is even smaller for Votes Far Left
because the United Left party did not run in every election. For RW Winner and RW Difference,
the sample is restricted to elections in which the PP and the PSOE were the two most-voted parties.
For the demographic variables, data are available only from 1996. Also note that, in municipalities
with no immigrants, EU Immigrants is missing by construction. See Appendix C for a precise
definition of the variables.
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Table 2: Effect of Direct Democracy on Public Finances
Panel A: Log Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp.
DirDem -0.0799∗∗∗ -0.0605∗∗ -0.0897∗∗ -0.0729∗∗ -0.0658∗ -0.111∗∗∗ -0.0491∗
(0.0267) (0.0249) (0.0408) (0.0309) (0.0354) (0.0420) (0.0261)
Observations 11932 17646 5964 42026 42026 42026 11932
Municipalities 1102 1405 756 2637 2637 2637 1102
Specification Linear Linear Linear Order 3 Order 4 Order 5 Linear
Bandwidth Optimala 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt. Full Full Full Opt.
Mun. trends Yes
Panel B: Log Revenues
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev.
DirDem -0.0521∗∗ -0.0637∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗ -0.0725∗∗ -0.0694∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.0542∗∗
(0.0261) (0.0231) (0.0412) (0.0284) (0.0326) (0.0392) (0.0235)
Observations 10625 16074 5542 42111 42111 42111 10625
Municipalities 1047 1340 729 2638 2638 2638 1047
Specification Linear Linear Linear Order 3 Order 4 Order 5 Linear
Bandwidth Optimalb 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt. Full Full Full Opt.
Mun. trends Yes
Panel C: Deficit (euros)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit
DirDem -7.877 -5.951 0.242 6.323 6.647 3.186 10.32
(8.050) (8.456) (9.387) (15.36) (18.96) (21.10) (17.60)
Observations 34570 41761 20647 42111 42111 42111 11958
Municipalities 2239 2620 1556 2638 2638 2638 1102
Specification Linear Linear Linear Order 3 Order 4 Order 5 Linear
Bandwidth Optimalc 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt. Full Full Full Opt.
Mun. trends Yes
Results from estimating Equation (2) (columns 1 to 6) and Equation (3) (column 7). Each column
is a separate regression with a uniform kernel. All regressions include municipality and year fixed
effects, and the last column also includes municipality-specific trends. Standard errors, clustered at
both municipality and the running variable, are in parentheses. I calculate the optimal bandwidth
following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012)’s procedure. a Optimal BW = 27, b Optimal BW =
25. c Optimal BW = 98. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3: Placebo Tests: Covariate Smoothness around the Threshold
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Mean Optimal BW Value Opt. BW Results .5 x Opt. BW Results
Votes Right (%) 51.6 29 -0.0866 0.0524
[N = 12642] (0.669) (0.966)
Votes Left (%) 30.6 31 -0.258 -0.382
[N = 13506] (0.550) (0.771)
Votes Far Left (%) 3.2 28 0.102 0.0510
[N = 10023] (0.271) (0.413)
Votes Difference (%) 31.0 33 0.603 1.284
[N = 13904] (1.014) (1.382)
Votes Winner (%) 59.3 34 0.330 0.374
[N = 14308] (0.603) (0.825)
Turnout (%) 78.3 30 -0.328 -0.144
[N = 13099] (0.440) (0.630)
Mean Age (years) 53.0 34 -0.143 -0.0412
[N = 9847] (0.191) (0.246)
Young (%) 9.2 41 -0.0993 -0.367
[N = 11428] (0.243) (0.290)
Middle-Aged (%) 53.4 37 0.226 0.523
[N = 10396] (0.426) (0.494)
Old (%) 37.3 40 -0.177 -0.225
[N = 11191] (0.433) (0.501)
Immigrants (%) 2.6 39 -0.240 -0.523
[N = 11185] (0.324) (0.397)
EU Immigrants (%) 45.4 29 -0.189 2.452
[N = 4056] (3.836) (4.978)
Column 1 shows the mean of the variables. Column 2 shows the optimal bandwidth value and number of
observations for a placebo test that estimates the effect of direct democracy on the corresponding variable,
according to Equation (2). Columns 3 and 4 show the results for the placebo tests: each column is a separate
local linear regression with a uniform kernel. Standard errors, clustered at both municipality and the running
variable, are in parentheses. The optimal bandwidth (BW) is based on Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 4: Placebo Tests: Lagged Outcomes
Panel A: Log Expenditures (t-1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp.
DirDem -0.0192 0.00203 -0.0124 -0.0148 -0.000786 -0.0176 -0.00907
(0.0291) (0.0287) (0.0420) (0.0354) (0.0417) (0.0493) (0.0305)
Observations 9433 13679 4738 33486 33486 33486 9433
Municipalities 1003 1294 678 2506 2506 2506 1003
Specification Linear Linear Linear Order 3 Order 4 Order 5 Linear
Bandwidth Optimala 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt. Full Full Full Optimala
Mun. trends Yes
Panel B: Log Revenues (t-1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev.
DirDem -0.00816 0.00801 -0.00210 -0.00493 0.0175 -0.0126 -0.00908
(0.0261) (0.0257) (0.0376) (0.0322) (0.0377) (0.0446) (0.0270)
Observations 9455 14027 4753 33553 33553 33553 9455
Municipalities 1003 1311 679 2507 2507 2507 1003
Specification Linear Linear Linear Order 3 Order 4 Order 5 Linear
Bandwidth Optimalb 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt. Full Full Full Optimalb
Mun. trends Yes
Panel C: Deficit (t-1) (euros)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit
DirDem -5.832 -2.534 -3.448 -7.204 -17.86 -11.41 -0.517
(9.638) (10.88) (13.62) (11.91) (13.97) (15.42) (9.515)
Observations 10738 16034 5360 33553 33553 33553 9455
Municipalities 1100 1436 727 2507 2507 2507 1003
Specification Linear Linear Linear Order 3 Order 4 Order 5 Linear
Bandwidth Optimalc 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt. Full Full Full Optimalc
Mun. trends Yes
Results from estimating Equation (2) (columns 1 to 6) and Equation (3) (column 7). Each column
is a separate regression with a uniform kernel. All regressions include municipality and year fixed
effects, and the last column also includes municipality-specific trends. Standard errors, clustered at
both municipality and the running variable, are in parentheses. I calculate the optimal bandwidth
following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012)’s procedure. a Optimal BW = 27, b Optimal BW =
28. c Optimal BW = 31. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 43 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1709
Figures
Figure 1: A town meeting in the municipality of Madarcos, in the Madrid
region. Source: documentary “Concejo Abierto”, by Carmen Comadra´n:
http://www.tierravoz.com/concejoabierto/el-corto/.
Figure 2: Histogram of population sizes. An observation is a municipality-year.
Bins are 10-inhabitant wide.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 44 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1709
(a) Log Expenditures (b) Log Revenues
(c) Deficit
Figure 3: Effect of direct democracy on expenditures, revenues, and deficit. I
estimate Outcomemyt = αm + γy +
100+OBW∑
j=100−OBW
δjPopulationj ,mt + umyt, where
Populationj ,mt is a dummy that indicates whether municipality m has population
size j at term t. In the y-axis, I plot the estimated coefficients δˆj , averaged to
4-inhabitant-wide bins. I normalize the coefficients so that the average bin imme-
diately to the right of the threshold takes the value of zero. The lines are linear
fits on δˆj , fitted separately for observations above and below the threshold. I use
the observations within the optimal bandwidth for LogExpendituresmyt , so that all
graphs show the same range in the x-axis.
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(a) Votes Right (b) Votes Left (c) Votes Far Left
(d) Votes Difference (e) Votes Winner (f) Turnout
(g) Mean Age (h) Young (i) Middle-Aged
(j) Old (k) Immigrants (l) EU Immigrants
Figure 4: Placebo Tests: Effect of direct democracy on political and demographic
variables. I estimate Outcomemyt = αm + γy +
100+OBW∑
j=100−OBW
δjPopulationj ,mt + umyt,
where Populationj ,mt is a dummy that indicates whether municipality m has popu-
lation size j at term t. In the y-axis, I plot the estimated coefficients δˆj , averaged
to 4-inhabitant-wide bins. I normalize the coefficients so that the average bin im-
mediately to the right of the threshold takes the value of zero. The lines are linear
fits on δˆj , fitted separately for observations above and below the threshold. I use
the observations within the optimal bandwidth for LogExpendituresmyt , so that all
graphs show the same range in the x-axis.
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(a) Log Expenditures (b) Log Expenditures
(c) Log Revenues (d) Log Revenues
(e) Deficit (f) Deficit
Figure 5: Placebo tests at other population thresholds. I run Equation (2) at all
(fake) population thresholds between 30 and 220 inhabitants, by replacing DD with
a dummy that indicates whether population is larger than the given population
threshold. The graphs show the empirical cumulative distribution functions for
the resulting point estimates and t-statistics. The vertical lines show the point
estimates (or t-statistics) for the effects of direct democracy, obtained at the (true)
100-inhabitant threshold. The p-value below each graph shows the share of point
estimates (or t-statistics) that are larger in absolute value than the one for the
100-inhabitant threshold.
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Supplementary Appendices
Appendix A: Model
There is a continuum of individuals who have to decide on two dimensions of policy.
The first one is a primary policy dimension, which I will call ideological stance,
or, simply, ideology, i. Ideology can be left wing, denoted by i, or right wing,
i, so i ∈ {i, i}. We can think of ideology as a salient policy issue, such as the
progressiveness of policy.49 The second issue is targeted or special-interest spending,
denoted by s. Spending also can take two values, s ∈ {s, s}, where s denotes low
(maybe zero) spending and s denotes high spending.
Individuals’ preferences differ over the two issues. With respect to ideology, indi-
viduals are divided into leftists and rightists, v ∈ {l, r}. A fraction γl of individuals
are leftists and prefer i. The rest, γr = 1 − γl, are rightists and prefer i. Let i∗(v)
denote the optimal ideological policy from the perspective of an individual of type
v (hence, i∗(l) = i and i∗(r) = i). Without loss of generality, I assume that leftists
are the majority, thus γl > .5. With respect to special-interest spending, individuals
are divided (independently of their preferences in regard to ideology) into citizens
and special interests, w ∈ {c, x}. A fraction γc of individuals are citizens, c, and
prefer low spending, s. The remaining individuals, γx = 1 − γc, are special inter-
ests and prefer high spending, s. The special interests are those who benefit from
special-interest spending, so they do not necessarily constitute an economic elite—
they could be, for example, public employees who are favored by the government.
Special interests are a minority, thus γx < γr. Let s
∗(w) denote the optimal ideo-
logical policy from the perspective of an individual of type w (hence, s∗(c) = s and
s∗(x) = s).
49For example, municipalities can use tax deductions to benefit poor individuals. Even if it
may seem surprising that a main “ideological” issue determines the vote at the local level, the
correlation between votes to the main right (left)-wing party in local and national elections is .63
(.57), suggesting that the determinants of voting are closely related at the two levels.
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Individuals’ utilities are given by:
ul,c(i, s) = blc [i = i] + θlc [s = s],
ur,c(i, s) = brc [i = i] + θrc [s = s],
ul,x(i, s) = blx [i = i] + θlx [s = s],
ur,x(i, s) = brx [i = i] + θrx [s = s], (6)
where uv,w denotes the utility of type (v, w). Citizens are more concerned about
ideology, so that blc > θlc and brc > θrc. The special interests, in contrast, care
more about special-interest spending, as they benefit directly from it: blx < θlx and
brx < θrx.
Policy under Representative Democracy
Under representative democracy, policy is delegated to an elected representative,
who is an individual and will always implement his or her preferred policy i∗(v), s∗(w)
—there is no possibility of commitment. Candidates in the election are put forward
by two political parties P, denoted A and B, P ∈ {A,B}. Each party is comprised
of member individuals bound together by their views on ideology. All members in
Party A are leftists, and all members in B are rightists. Within each party, however,
there can be any combination of citizens and special interests, so that, even if in the
entire population citizens are a majority, that may or may not be the case within
political parties. Each party selects a candidate that a majority of its members
prefer. Because every individual within a party shares the same preferences toward
ideology, the preferences of the majority in the spending dimension will determine
which candidate the party proposes. Let s∗P denote the preferences of the major-
ity of Party P on spending. Parties are not restricted to proposing a member of
their own party; thus, in principle, they could propose somebody with an opposing
ideology, but that will not happen in equilibrium.
To introduce uncertainty into the election, Besley and Coate (2008) assume that
there are some noise voters, a fraction of whom will vote for A’s candidate according
to the realization of some random variable. To keep the notation simple, I assume
instead that the probability that Party A’s candidate wins the election is given by
the share of individuals who prefer Party A’s candidate over Party B’s candidate.50
50The insights and conclusions are the same with both approaches.
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Naturally, an individual prefers Party A’s candidate if the policy that Party A’s
candidate will implement gives him or her more utility than will the policy that
Party B’s candidate will implement, according to (6). More formally, an individual
of type {v, w} faced with candidates (vA, wA) and (vB, wB) will favor Party A’s
candidate if uv,w(i
∗(vA), s∗(wA)) > uv,w(i∗(vB), s∗(wB)), and will favor Party B’s
candidate if uv,w(i
∗(vA), s∗(wA)) < uv,w(i∗(vB), s∗(wB)). If both candidates give
him or her the same utility, then he or she will favor each candidate with probability
1/2.
Party members know the election probabilities associated with different candi-
date pairs and take them into account when selecting candidates. An equilibrium is
a pair of candidates, one for each party, such that each party’s majority members do
not want to deviate from their choice, given the other party’s choice. More formally,
a pair of candidates (vA, wA) and (vB, wB) is an equilibrium if type (l, s
∗
A) individ-
uals prefer a type (vA, wA) candidate to any other type of candidate, given that
Party B is running a type (vB, wB) candidate and, conversely, type (r, s
∗
B) individu-
als prefer a type (vB, wB) candidate to any other type of candidate, given that Party
A is running a type (vA, wA) candidate. Any equilibrium results in a probability
distribution over outcomes. The policy outcome will be that associated with Party
P’s candidate with a probability equal to the chance that Party P’s candidate wins.
Equilibrium under Representative Democracy
Case 1: For each P, s∗P = s.
In this case, special interests are a majority in both political parties. This repre-
sents a situation in which political parties are captured by special interests. In this
case, an equilibrium exists in which both parties run with a special interest of their
preferred ideological position, and that equilibrium is unique. This is summarized
in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. If, for each P, s∗P = s, then (vA = l, wA = x) and (vB = r, wB = x)
is the unique equilibrium.
Proof. I need to show that if, for each P , s∗P = s, then (vA = l, wA = x) and
(vB = r, wB = x) is the unique equilibrium.
I first show that (vA = l, wA = x) and (vB = r, wB = x) is an equilibrium.
In the proposed equilibrium, Party A wins the election with probability γl, and
its median voter, who is a leftist special interest, gets utility blx+θlx if that happens.
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If Party B wins, the median voter in Party A gets utility θlx. Therefore, the expected
utility of the median voter in Party A, which I will denote by u(A), is u∗(A) =
γl(blx + θlx) + γrθlx = θlx + γlblx in the proposed equilibrium.
Party A has three possible deviations: (a) If it deviates to proposing (vA =
l, wA = c), Party A reduces both the probability of winning (to γcγl) and the utility
in case of a win (to blx), so u(A) = γcγlblx+(1− γcγl)θlx < u∗(A). (b) If it deviates
to (vA = r, wA = c), Party A increases the probability of winning from γl to γc but
at the cost of getting zero utility if that happens (it is proposing its least preferred
policy): u(A) = γxθlx < u
∗(A). (c) If it deviates to (vA = r, wA = x), then both
parties propose the same policy and win with 1/2 probability, and u(A) = θlx <
u∗(A).
Now consider Party B. In the proposed equilibrium, its median voter, who is
a rightist special interest, has expected utility u∗(B) = γr(brx + θrx) + γlθrx =
θrx + γrbrx. Consider the three possible deviations: (a) If it deviates to proposing
(vB = r, wB = c), u(B) = γcγrbrx + (1 − γcγr)θrx < u∗(B). (b) If it deviates to
(vB = l, wB = c), u(B) = γxθrx < u
∗(B). (c) If it deviates to (vB = l, wB = x),
u(B) = θrx < u
∗(B). This completes the proof that (vA = l, wA = x) and (vB =
r, wB = x) is an equilibrium.
I now show that the equilibrium (vA = l, wA = x) and (vB = r, wB = x) is
unique. To do so, I will show that (vA = l, wA = c) and (vB = r, wB = c) is
not an equilibrium (it is trivial to show that other possible proposals cannot be an
equilibrium). Under (vA = l, wA = c) and (vB = r, wB = c), u
∗(A) = γlblx. If A
deviates to (vA = l, wA = x), u(A) = (γcγl+γx)(blx+ θlx) > u
∗(A). Thus, A prefers
to deviate, and (vA = l, wA = c) and (vB = r, wB = c) cannot be an equilibrium.
The intuition is as follows. Party A will not want to switch to a leftist citizen, as
it would lower the probability of winning (from γl to γlγc, as it loses all of the votes
of the special interests), and it would lower the utility in case of a win for the median
individual in the party, which is a special interest. The same happens if Party A
switches to a rightist special interest—in this case, the probability of winning goes
down to 1/2, as both parties propose the exact same types of candidates. Finally, a
“radical” switch to a rightist citizen increases the probability of winning (to γl) but
at the cost of sacrificing the preferred policy in both dimensions, so the utility in
the case of winning is zero. The reasoning for Party B is analogous. Finally, note
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that both parties running with a citizen of their preferred ideological type cannot be
an equilibrium, as both parties would want to deviate to a special interest of their
preferred ideological type.
Case 2: For each P, s∗P = s.
In this case, citizens are a majority in political parties, as they are in the entire
population. In this case as well, an equilibrium exists in which both parties run
with a special-interest candidate of their preferred ideological position, under certain
conditions that are indicated in the following proposition.



















γx + γcγr − γr ,
then the equilibrium is unique.







then (vA = l, wA = x) and (vB = r, wB = x) is an equilibrium.
Under the proposed equilibrium, the median voter in Party A, who is a leftist
citizen, has an expected utility of u∗(A) = γlblc. Consider his or her three possible
deviations: (a) If it deviates to (vA = l, wA = c), Party A increases the utility in




> γcγx , by assumption, u(A) = γcγl(blc + γlc) < u
∗(A). (b) If
it deviates to (vA = r, wA = c), u(A) = γcθlc. Because
blc
θlc
> γcγx , by assumption,
u(A) < u∗(A). (c) If it deviates to (vA = r, wA = x), u(A) = 0 < u∗(A). For Party
B, the argument is symmetric.
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γx + γcγr − γr ,
then the equilibrium is unique.
I will first show that (vA = l, wA = c) and (vB = r, wB = c) is not an equilibrium.
Under (vA = l, wA = c) and (vB = r, wB = c), u
∗(A) = γlblc+θlc. Consider the best
deviation possible deviation for A, which is (vA = l, wA = x) (it is trivial to show
that the two other possible deviations are worse). Then, u(A) = (γcγl + γx)blc +





γx + γcγl − γl ,
then u(A) < u∗(A), so Party A will prefer to deviate. For Party B, the best possible





γx + γcγr − γr ,












γx + γcγr − γr ,
then (vA = l, wA = c) and (vB = r, wB = c) is not an equilibrium.
Assumption (i) rules out that parties want to deviate by running with a citi-
zen instead of a special interest. By proposing a citizen, the median voter in the
parties sacrifices some probability of winning (for Party A, it goes down to γcγl
from γl) but obtains some additional utility if the party wins the election, (γcl).
The assumption guarantees that the first effect dominates the second by requiring
that ideology, relative to spending, is sufficiently important to citizens, given the
distribution of types in the population (or, stated differently, that there are enough
special interests, given the preferences of citizens). Assumption (ii) rules out that
both parties’ choosing a citizen is an equilibrium.
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Case 3: s∗P = s for some P, s
∗
P′ = s for P = P′.
This case is a combination of the other two: Citizens are the majority in one party
but not in the other.
Proposition 3. If s∗l = s, s
∗
r = s, and blc/θlc > γc/γx, then (vA = l, wA = x) and
(vB = r, wB = x) is the unique equilibrium. If s
∗
l = s, s
∗
r = s, and brc/θrc > γc/γx,
then (vA = l, wA = x) and (vB = r, wB = x) is the unique equilibrium.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 3 follows directly from the proof of Proposition 1
and the proof of Proposition 2.
Following the logic of the first two cases, now the requirement that special in-
terests are sufficiently large is required only for the party in which citizens are a
majority.
Policy and Equilibrium under Direct Democracy
Under direct democracy, ideology and spending are voted on separately. The equi-
librium outcomes are therefore i = i and s = s. Intuitively, as issues are unbundled,
the position preferred by the median voter (a leftist in ideology and a citizen in
spending) prevails in both dimensions.
In sum, the model predicts that direct democracy will reduce spending if special
interests have captured political parties, or if they are sufficiently large. In addition,
the model predicts that spending in representative democracy should not depend
on which party is in office: Both parties, A and B, converge to the overspending
position. Finally, it is important to note that the model does not yield a clear-cut
prediction in terms of welfare. Even if direct democracy leads to policy more in line
with the median voter’s preferences, a switch from representative to direct democ-
racy creates winners and losers. Citizens, who are the majority, benefit from direct
democracy as a result of reduced special-interest spending, while special interests
lose. But special interests may feel more intensely about the issue. Hence, a measure
of welfare—for example, utilitarian—could rise or fall.
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territories in he Early Middle Ages, when neighbors organized themselves in assem-
blies to decide on the government of villages. Traditionally, municipalities them-
selves decided whether to work under direct or representative democracy. A first
attempt to introduced a population threshold took place in 1924, when a national
law (Estatuto Municipal) imposed the use of direct democracy to all municipalities
with fewer than 500 inhabitants. However, this provision was never enforced. Dur-
ing the Second Spanish Republic, another attempt was made to extend the use of
direct democracy to all municipalities with fewer than 500 inhabitants (1935 Law),
but this attempt never materialized either, as the regime lasted only one more year
before the onset of the Spanish Civil War in 1936. The situation did not change
during Franco’s regime. A 1955 law (Ley de Re´gimen Local) required the following
of the direct-democracy system only for those municipalities in which that was the
traditional form of government. It was not until after the restoration of democracy
after Franco’s death in 1975 that the rules changed substantially. In 1978, national
law (Ley de Elecciones Locales) required all municipalities whose population in the
election-year was smaller than 25 inhabitants to follow the direct democracy-system.
In 1985, a reform extended the requirement to all municipalities with fewer than
100 inhabitants.51 This regulation was in force until 2011, and is the focus of this
paper. In 2011, the law was changed to eliminate the requirement to follow direct
democracy for municipalities with fewer than 100 inhabitants. The rationale for this
change was that most local politicians preferred to avoid direct democracy (which
is consistent with the sorting around the threshold) for the reasons discussed in
Section 5. Municipalities can still adopt the direct-democracy system, by following
the procedure described in the national law (similar to the one described in footnote
51), but no municipality is now required to follow direct democracy. No official data
regarding the use of direct democracy after 2011 exist yet, but partial data indicate
that it is low (8.3%), consistent with the purpose of the change in the law.
51Municipalities with 100 or more inhabitants could follow a demanding procedure to adopt
the direct-democracy system. Specifically, a majority of the citizens of the municipality had to
sign a petition, and two-thirds of the members of the council and the regional government had to
approve. To the best of my knowledge, no municipality ever used this procedure. This implies that
the regression discontinuity component of the estimation is sharp, as the probability of treatment
jumps from 0 to 1 at the threshold.
Appendix B: Historical Overview
The use of concejo abierto dates from centuries ago (for a detailed historical overview,
see Salanova Alcalde (2009)). In a primitive form, they appeared in the Christian
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Appendix C: Definition of Variables
In this Appendix, I provide details on the definition of the variables used in the
paper.
Budget Variables
Expenditures is defined as the sum of all (non-financial) chapters of the expenditures





where m denotes municipality, y denotes the year, t denotes the term, Ek is expendi-
tures per capita on Chapter k of the expenditures budget, and Rk denotes revenues
per capita from Chapter k of the revenues budget.





Transfersmyt = R4,myt +R7,myt − E4,myt − E7,myt,
Deficitmyt = Expendituresmyt − Revenuesmyt .
Elections Variables
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where
VotesCastmt = VotesForCandidatesmt + BlankVotesmt + SpoiltVotesmt,
ValidVotesmt = VotesForCandidatesmt + BlankVotesmt.
That is, Turnout measures the proportion of citizens who cast a vote over the
set of potential voters (the electoral census). There is no voter registration in Spain:
Potential voters are all citizens of Spain and other EU countries as well as countries
under Reciprocity Treaties; older than 18, and not disenfranchised by court order.52
Valid votes include votes for candidates and blank votes but not spoiled votes. I use
this denominator because it is relevant for the allocation of seats, as it is used to
determine whether parties reach the election threshold to get seats (3% in national
elections). Accordingly, it is the one that is normally reported by the media.
Observations for year y are from the Congress elections that take place during the
term t to which year y belongs. Because Congress elections have always alternated
perfectly with local elections, there is only one Congress election per term. For
example, for years 1988-1991, I consider the Congress elections of 1989. As explained
in the text, I lag the variables to use them as placebos.
Demographic Variables
The age distribution data are provided by the National Institute for Statistics in
intervals of five years, up to “85 or more” until 2010 and up to “100 or more” from
2011. To calculate the average ageMean Age, I use the mid-points of those intervals.
For ages 85–100 (for which there is no five-year information until 2011), I calculate
the average age in 2011 (89.01) and use it for the rest of the years. For ages “100
or more,” I assume the average is 102.5 years.
I define the share of young people Young as the share of individuals in the first
four intervals (19 years old or younger), Middle-Aged as the share of individuals in
the next nine intervals (ages 20–64), and Old as the share of individuals in the final
five intervals (ages 65 or older).
52Disenfranchisement is mostly for disability reasons. In 2011, the number of disenfranchised
individuals was 79,398 (including individuals younger than 18) or approximately 0.18% of the
population.
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Appendix Tables
Table A1: Number of Municipalities and Switches by Government System
Panel A: Number of Municipalities by Government System
Term DirDem RepDem Total
1987–1991 603 1385 1988
1991–1995 614 1319 1933
1995–1999 695 1387 2082
1999–2003 781 1475 2256
2003–2007 797 1486 2283
2007–2011 827 1510 2337
Panel B: Number of Switches in Government System
Term RepDem → DirDem DirDem → RepDem Total
1st to 2nd 50 13 63
2nd to 3rd 93 21 114
3rd to 4th 94 19 113
4th to 5th 69 38 107
5th to 6th 73 43 116
Total 379 134 513
The data refer to the municipalities used in the estimation—that is, those with
a population of 250 or fewer inhabitants, and with non-missing data for some
year(s) of the term.
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Table A2: Effect of Direct Democracy on Public Finances (No Fixed Effects)
Panel A: Log Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp.
DirDem -0.187∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗ -0.156∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗ -0.169∗∗∗ -0.138∗∗∗
(0.0357) (0.0365) (0.0288) (0.0403) (0.0397) (0.0445)
Observations 11975 17691 6001 42078 42078 42078
Municipalities 1145 1450 793 2689 2689 2689
Specification Linear Linear Linear Order 3 Order 4 Order 5
Bandwidth Optimala 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt. Full Full Full
Panel B: Log Revenues
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev.
DirDem -0.152∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗ -0.152∗∗∗ -0.171∗∗∗ -0.177∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗
(0.0320) (0.0329) (0.0248) (0.0379) (0.0371) (0.0414)
Observations 10662 16117 5578 42162 42162 42162
Municipalities 1084 1383 765 2689 2689 2689
Specification Linear Linear Linear Order 3 Order 4 Order 5
Bandwidth Optimalb 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt. Full Full Full
Panel C: Deficit (euros)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit
DirDem -1.851 0.266 -1.722 -3.571 12.82 -6.372
(7.883) (7.585) (9.366) (15.24) (19.27) (19.50)
Observations 34617 41811 20694 42162 42162 42162
Municipalities 2286 2670 1603 2689 2689 2689
Specification Linear Linear Linear Order 3 Order 4 Order 5
Bandwidth Optimalc 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt. Full Full Full
Results from estimating Equation (1). Each column is a separate regression with a uniform
kernel. Standard errors, clustered at both municipality and the running variable, are in
parentheses. I calculate the optimal bandwidth following Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012)’s procedure. a Optimal BW = 54, b Optimal BW = 53. c Optimal BW = 122. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A3: Placebo Tests: Covariate Smoothness around the Threshold (No Fixed
Effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Mean Optimal BW Value Opt. BW Results .5 x Opt. BW Results
Votes Right (%) 51.6 94 0.619 0.359
[N = 12687] (1.684) (2.139)
Votes Left (%) 30.6 76 -2.768∗∗∗ -1.984
[N = 13551] (1.003) (1.257)
Votes Far Left (%) 3.2 77 0.0979 0.0346
[N = 10071] (0.280) (0.330)
Votes Difference (%) 31.0 58 2.203 2.308
[N = 13952] (1.517) (2.031)
Votes Winner (%) 59.3 58 0.508 0.761
[N = 14355] (0.915) (1.279)
Turnout (%) 78.3 55 -0.543 -0.944∗
[N = 13142] (0.482) (0.561)
Mean Age (years) 53.0 104 0.275 0.431
[N = 9910] (0.381) (0.398)
Young (%) 9.2 79 0.140 -0.0464
[N = 11483] (0.333) (0.318)
Middle-Aged (%) 53.4 83 -0.897 -1.440∗
[N = 10450] (0.691) (0.848)
Old (%) 37.3 148 0.764 1.306
[N = 11247] (0.803) (0.931)
Immigrants (%) 2.6 150 -0.206 -0.0970
[N = 11242] (0.275) (0.272)
EU Immigrants (%) 45.4 62 -3.182 3.855
[N = 4161] (4.255) (5.538)
Column 1 shows the mean of the variables. Column 2 shows the optimal bandwidth value and number of
observations for a placebo test that estimates the effect of direct democracy on the corresponding variable,
according to Equation (1). Columns 3 and 4 show the results for the placebo tests: each column is a separate
local linear regression with a uniform kernel. Standard errors, clustered at both municipality and the running
variable, are in parentheses. The optimal bandwidth (BW) is based on Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table A4: Placebo Tests: Lagged Outcomes (No Fixed Effects)
Panel A: Log Expenditures (t-1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp.
DirDem -0.143∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -0.0817∗∗ -0.155∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗ -0.0803
(0.0395) (0.0408) (0.0379) (0.0471) (0.0480) (0.0529)
Observations 9501 13734 4790 33561 33561 33561
Municipalities 1071 1349 730 2581 2581 2581
Specification Linear Linear Linear Order 3 Order 4 Order 5
Bandwidth Optimala 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt. Full Full Full
Panel B: Log Revenues (t-1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev.
DirDem -0.131∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗ -0.0675∗ -0.145∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗ -0.0697
(0.0392) (0.0408) (0.0396) (0.0466) (0.0472) (0.0534)
Observations 9524 14086 4805 33628 33628 33628
Municipalities 1072 1370 731 2582 2582 2582
Specification Linear Linear Linear Order 3 Order 4 Order 5
Bandwidth Optimalb 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt. Full Full Full
Panel C: Deficit (t-1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit
DirDem -15.76∗ -14.06∗ -8.795 -17.46 -7.398 -26.68∗
(8.187) (7.905) (11.39) (11.82) (14.34) (15.91)
Observations 10808 16103 5415 33628 33628 33628
Municipalities 1170 1505 782 2582 2582 2582
Specification Linear Linear Linear Order 3 Order 4 Order 5
Bandwidth Optimalc 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt. Full Full Full
Results from estimating Equation (1). Each column is a separate regression with a uniform
kernel. Standard errors, clustered at both municipality and the running variable, are in
parentheses. I calculate the optimal bandwidth following Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012)’s procedure. a Optimal BW = 54, b Optimal BW = 53. c Optimal BW = 122. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A5: Effect by Switches into and out of Direct Democracy
Panel A: Log Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp.
DirDem -0.0799∗∗∗ -0.0665∗∗ -0.0518∗ -0.0786∗ -0.141∗∗∗ -0.0835∗∗ -0.116
(0.0267) (0.0289) (0.0268) (0.0439) (0.0452) (0.0362) (0.0792)
Observations 11932 11347 16987 5520 10379 16025 4664
Municipalities 1102 1093 1402 736 1090 1398 696
Specification Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear
Bandwidth Optimala Opt. 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt. Opt. 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt.
Switches All Into Into Into Out of Out of Out of
Panel B: Log Revenues
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev.
DirDem -0.0521∗∗ -0.0422 -0.0551∗∗ -0.0991∗∗ -0.0877∗ -0.0968∗∗∗ -0.0729
(0.0261) (0.0283) (0.0249) (0.0451) (0.0467) (0.0348) (0.0841)
Observations 10625 10054 15436 5107 9076 14464 4281
Municipalities 1047 1034 1337 709 1029 1333 666
Specification Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear
Bandwidth Optimalb Opt. 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt. Opt. 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt.
Switches All Into Into Into Out of Out of Out of
Panel C: Deficit (euros)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit
DirDem -7.877 -6.187 -3.236 1.468 -17.49∗ -13.77 -5.560
(8.050) (8.465) (8.572) (9.726) (9.283) (9.398) (10.20)
Observations 34570 33680 40796 19965 32726 39842 19006
Municipalities 2239 2233 2614 1555 2232 2613 1554
Specification Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear
Bandwidth Optimalc Opt. 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt. Opt. 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt.
Switches All Into Into Into Out of Out of Out of
Results from estimating Equation (2). Each column is a separate regression with a uniform kernel.
All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects. Columns with switches “Into” (“Out
of”) exclude from the sample the municipality-years corresponding to terms in which a munici-
pality switched from direct (representative) to representative (direct) democracy. Standard errors,
clustered at both municipality and the running variable, are in parentheses. I calculate the opti-
mal bandwidth following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012)’s procedure. a Optimal BW = 27, b
Optimal BW = 25. c Optimal BW = 98. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A6: Donut Regressions
Panel A: Log Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp.
DirDem -0.0799∗∗∗ -0.0671∗∗ -0.0388 -0.0439 -0.0635 -0.0724
(0.0267) (0.0290) (0.0325) (0.0376) (0.0417) (0.0496)
Observations 11932 11484 11017 10553 10152 9679
Municipalities 1102 1099 1095 1092 1090 1083
Specification Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear
Bandwidth Optimala Opt. Opt. Opt. Opt. Opt.
Excluded 0 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%
Panel B: Log Revenues
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev.
DirDem -0.0521∗∗ -0.0428 -0.0111 -0.0169 -0.0141 -0.0358
(0.0261) (0.0288) (0.0324) (0.0375) (0.0437) (0.0534)
Observations 10625 10176 9708 9243 8836 8363
Municipalities 1047 1044 1037 1034 1030 1023
Specification Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear
Bandwidth Optimalb Opt. Opt. Opt. Opt. Opt.
Excluded 0 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%
Panel C: Deficit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit
DirDem -7.877 -5.328 -4.899 -3.978 -9.502 -13.50
(8.050) (8.586) (9.043) (9.562) (8.459) (8.866)
Observations 34570 34121 33653 33189 32783 32309
Municipalities 2239 2238 2238 2237 2236 2234
Specification Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear
Bandwidth Optimalc Opt. Opt. Opt. Opt. Opt.
Excluded 0 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%
Results from estimating Equation (2). Each column is a separate regression with a uniform
kernel. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered
at both municipality and the running variable, are in parentheses. I calculate the optimal
bandwidth following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012)’s procedure. a Optimal BW = 27, b
Optimal BW = 25, c Optimal BW = 98. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A7: Robustness to Top-Coding Outliers
Panel A: Log Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp.
DirDem -0.0799∗∗∗ -0.0815∗∗∗ -0.0625∗∗∗ -0.0797∗∗∗ -0.0394 -0.0793∗∗
(0.0267) (0.0255) (0.0232) (0.0244) (0.0278) (0.0392)
Observations 11932 11932 17646 14763 8914 5964
Municipalities 1102 1102 1405 1263 946 756
Bandwidth Optimala Opt. 1.5 x Opt. 1.25 x Opt. .75 x Opt. .5 x Opt.
Top-Coding NO YES YES YES YES YES
Panel B: Log Revenues
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev.
DirDem -0.0521∗∗ -0.0534∗∗ -0.0700∗∗∗ -0.0742∗∗∗ -0.0492∗ -0.0987∗∗
(0.0261) (0.0252) (0.0217) (0.0234) (0.0263) (0.0394)
Observations 10625 10625 16074 13555 8064 5542
Municipalities 1047 1047 1340 1198 892 729
Bandwidth Optimalb Opt. 1.5 x Opt. 1.25 x Opt. .75 x Opt. .5 x Opt.
Top-Coding NO YES YES YES YES YES
Panel C: Deficit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit
DirDem -7.877 -4.460 -3.072 -3.619 -4.848 -2.212
(8.050) (4.990) (4.848) (4.902) (5.211) (5.935)
Observations 34570 34570 41761 38310 29227 20647
Municipalities 2239 2239 2620 2438 1960 1556
Bandwidth Optimalc Opt. 1.5 x Opt. 1.25 x Opt. .75 x Opt. .5 x Opt.
Top-Coding NO YES YES YES YES YES
Results from estimating Equation (2). The top-coded regressions winsorize the observations
with a dependent-variable value above the top or below the bottom 1% of the observations
within the bandwidth. Each column is a separate regression with a uniform kernel. All regres-
sions include municipality and year fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered at both municipality
and the running variable, are in parentheses. I calculate the optimal bandwidth following Im-
bens and Kalyanaraman (2012)’s procedure. a Optimal BW = 27, b Optimal BW = 25, c
Optimal BW = 98. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 64 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1709
Table A8: Number of Observations at the Threshold
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Obs. Obs. Obs. Obs. Obs.
DirDem 0.0204 0.0168 0.0143 0.00376 0.0462
(0.0197) (0.0186) (0.0190) (0.0265) (0.0426)
Observations 18164 27188 22636 9480 4916
Municipalities 1255 1596 1437 901 671
Bandwidth Optimala 1.5 x Opt. 1.25 x Opt. .75 x Opt. .25 x Opt.
Results from estimating Equation (2). The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the
value of 1 if data are available for a (potential) observation and 0 if the data are missing. Each
column is a separate regression with a uniform kernel. All regressions include municipality and
year fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered at both municipality and the running variable,
are in parentheses. I calculate the optimal bandwidth following Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012)’s procedure. aOptimal BW = 73 inhabitants. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A9: Effect of Political Parties on Policy under Representative Democracy
Panel A: First Stage: Effect of RW Winner on RW Mayor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RW Mayor RW Mayor RW Mayor RW Mayor RW Mayor RW Mayor
RW Winner 0.566∗∗∗ 0.550∗∗∗ 0.631∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗ 0.524∗∗∗ 0.568∗∗∗
(0.0315) (0.0225) (0.0569) (0.0225) (0.0181) (0.0329)
Observations 18772 27717 9476 18873 27806 9549
Municipalities 2845 3471 1843 2946 3560 1916
Fixed effects NO NO NO YES YES YES
Bandwidth Optimala 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt. Opt. 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt.
Panel B: Effect of RW Mayor on Log Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp.
RW Mayor 0.0346 0.0217 -0.0210 0.0181 0.0283 0.0220
(0.0542) (0.0423) (0.0757) (0.0273) (0.0207) (0.0418)
Observations 33481 46776 17557 33401 46708 17459
Municipalities 3869 4478 2827 3789 4410 2729
Fixed effects NO NO NO YES YES YES
Bandwidth Optimalb 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt. Opt. 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt.
Panel C: Effect of RW Mayor on Log Revenues
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev.
RW Mayor 0.0580 0.0276 -0.00799 0.0355 0.0110 0.0328
(0.0571) (0.0446) (0.0799) (0.0271) (0.0207) (0.0421)
Observations 31070 43917 16186 30984 43848 16090
Municipalities 3747 4351 2690 3661 4282 2594
Fixed effects NO NO NO YES YES YES
Bandwidth Optimalc 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt. Opt. 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt.
Panel D: Effect of RW Mayor on Deficit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit
RW Mayor -20.86∗∗ -12.27 -30.53∗∗ -12.75 -5.076 -17.45
(9.082) (7.941) (13.08) (10.98) (9.388) (18.34)
Observations 20816 30322 10667 20717 30237 10591
Municipalities 3094 3707 2072 2995 3622 1996
Fixed effects NO NO NO YES YES YES
Bandwidth Optimald 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt. Opt. 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt.
Results from estimating Equation (4). The sample is restricted to elections where the PP and PSOE
were the two most-voted parties. Each column is a separate local linear regression with a uniform kernel.
Standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, are in parentheses. Fixed effects are municipality
and year fixed effects. The optimal bandwidth (BW) is based on Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
a Optimal BW = 9 percentage points, b Optimal BW = 17 percentage points, c Optimal BW = 15
percentage points, d Optimal BW = 10 percentage points. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table A10: Placebo Tests: Covariate Smoothness for “Effects of Political Parties on
Policy under Representative Democracy”
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Mean Optimal BW Value Opt. BW Results .5 x Opt. BW Results
Votes Right (%) 51.6 11 -0.452 -1.948
[N = 24142] (0.981) (1.345)
Votes Left (%) 30.6 10 1.255 2.154
[N = 20787] (0.936) (1.321)
Votes Far Left (%) 3.2 9 -0.885∗ -0.987
[N = 15221] (0.470) (0.649)
Votes Difference (%) 31.0 12 0.208 0.115
[N = 25609] (1.039) (1.422)
Votes Winner (%) 59.3 14 0.772 1.022
[N = 29447] (0.601) (0.821)
Turnout (%) 78.3 11 -1.787∗∗ -1.128
[N = 22498] (0.744) (0.978)
Mean Age (years) 53.0 12 0.691 1.529∗
[N = 16313] (0.679) (0.889)
Young (%) 9.2 13 -0.998∗ -1.796∗∗
[N = 18259] (0.593) (0.785)
Middle-Aged (%) 53.4 14 -0.396 -0.794
[N = 19014] (0.625) (0.840)
Old (%) 37.3 20 1.557∗ 1.130
[N = 25697] (0.870) (1.182)
Immigrants (%) 2.6 16 0.0441 0.460
[N = 21368] (0.637) (0.948)
EU Immigrants (%) 45.4 14 3.253 1.357
[N = 16898] (3.259) (4.400)
Column 1 shows the mean of the variables. Column 2 shows the optimal bandwidth value and number
of observations for a placebo test that estimates the effect of RW Mayor on the corresponding variable,
according to Equation (4). Columns 3 and 4 show the results for the placebo tests: each column is a separate
local linear regression with a uniform kernel. Standard errors, clustered at both municipality and the running
variable, are in parentheses. The optimal bandwidth (BW) is based on Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table A11: Effect of Political Parties on Policy under Direct Democracy
Panel A: Effect of RW Mayor on Log Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp. Log Exp.
RW Mayor 0.0610 0.0492 -0.117 -0.0637 -0.0596 -0.169
(0.133) (0.106) (0.228) (0.116) (0.0832) (0.252)
Observations 2035 3078 1025 2007 3045 1010
Municipalities 375 495 239 347 462 224
Fixed effects NO NO NO YES YES YES
Bandwidth Optimalb 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt. Opt. 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt.
Panel B: Effect of RW Mayor on Log Revenues
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev. Log Rev.
RW Mayor 0.0596 0.0601 -0.0382 -0.0301 -0.0904 0.0261
(0.136) (0.108) (0.230) (0.111) (0.0818) (0.206)
Observations 1980 3004 997 1954 2972 982
Municipalities 368 489 235 342 457 220
Fixed effects NO NO NO YES YES YES
Bandwidth Optimalc 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt. Opt. 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt.
Panel C: Effect of RW Mayor on Deficit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit
RW Mayor 16.79 13.48 21.91 27.06 14.67 -56.13
(21.90) (18.66) (27.26) (36.01) (23.01) (50.19)
Observations 3540 5454 1764 3506 5406 1741
Municipalities 545 727 341 511 679 318
Fixed effects NO NO NO YES YES YES
Bandwidth Optimald 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt. Opt. 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt.
Results from estimating Equation (4) for direct-democracy municipalities. The sample is restricted to
elections where the PP and PSOE were the two most-voted parties. Each column is a separate local linear
regression with a uniform kernel. Standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, are in parentheses.
Fixed effects are municipality and year fixed effects. The optimal bandwidth (BW) is based on Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012). a Optimal BW = 33 percentage points, b Optimal BW = 33 percentage
points, c Optimal BW = 58 percentage points. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table A12: Effect of Direct Democracy on the Variability of Policy
Panel A: Log Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
|uˆexp,mt| |uˆexp,mt| |uˆexp,mt| |uˆexp,mt| |uˆexp,mt| |uˆexp,mt| |uˆexp,mt|
DirDem -0.0418∗∗ -0.0300∗ -0.00694 -0.0452 -0.0391 -0.0234 -0.0117
(0.0204) (0.0154) (0.0384) (0.0286) (0.0364) (0.0454) (0.0220)
Observations 6333 9349 3130 11932 11932 11932 6333
Municipalities 782 975 538 1102 1102 1102 782
Specification Linear Linear Linear Order 3 Order 4 Order 5 Linear
Bandwidth Optimala 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt. Full Full Full Optimala
Mun. trends Yes
Panel B: Log Revenues
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
|uˆrev,mt| |uˆexp,mt| |uˆrev,mt| |uˆrev,mt| |uˆrev,mt| |uˆrev,mt| |uˆrev,mt|
DirDem -0.0348 -0.0245 -0.00604 -0.0354 -0.0370 -0.0424 0.00512
(0.0254) (0.0165) (0.0343) (0.0261) (0.0315) (0.0391) (0.0289)
Observations 4653 6774 2225 10625 10625 10625 4653
Municipalities 668 808 426 1047 1047 1047 668
Specification Linear Linear Linear Order 3 Order 4 Order 5 Linear
Bandwidth Optimalb 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt. Full Full Full Optimalb
Mun. trends Yes
Panel C: Deficit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
|uˆdef,mt| |uˆdef,mt| |uˆdef,mt| |uˆdef,mt| |uˆdef,mt| |uˆdef,mt| |uˆdef,mt|
DirDem -11.08 -12.61∗ -8.971 -16.06 -2.256 -11.43 -4.158
(7.592) (7.363) (9.212) (12.00) (14.30) (16.41) (13.91)
Observations 28337 34570 15225 34570 34570 34570 11958
Municipalities 1927 2239 1285 2239 2239 2239 1102
Specification Linear Linear Linear Order 3 Order 4 Order 5 Linear
Bandwidth Optimalc 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt. Full Full Full Optimalc
Mun. trends Yes
Results from estimating Equation (2) (columns 1 to 6) or Equation (3) (column 7). The dependent
variable is the absolute value of the residuals obtained from previously estimating Equation (2)
or Equation (3). Each column is a separate regression with a uniform kernel. All regressions
include municipality and year fixed effects, and the last column also includes municipality-specific
trends. Standard errors, clustered at both municipality and the running variable, are in parentheses.
I calculate the optimal bandwidth following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012)’s procedure. a
Optimal BW = 14, b Optimal BW = 10. c Optimal BW = 71. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A15: Effect of Direct Democracy on Transfers from Upper-Level Governments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log Tr. Log Tr. Log Tr. Log Tr. Log Tr. Log Tr. Log Tr.
DirDem 0.0109 -0.0202 0.00613 -0.00143 0.00195 0.0496 -0.0229
(0.0489) (0.0435) (0.0656) (0.0577) (0.0662) (0.0768) (0.0499)
Observations 12655 19064 6525 40550 40550 40550 11504
Municipalities 1163 1506 803 2630 2630 2630 1096
Specification Linear Linear Linear Order 3 Order 4 Order 5 Linear
Bandwidth Optimala 1.5 x Opt. .5 x Opt. Full Full Full Opt.
Mun. trends Yes
Results from estimating Equation (2) (columns 1 to 6) and Equation (3) (column 7). Each column
is a separate regression with a uniform kernel. All regressions include municipality and year fixed
effects, and the last column also includes municipality-specific trends. Standard errors, clustered at
both municipality and the running variable, are in parentheses. I calculate the optimal bandwidth
following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012)’s procedure. a Optimal BW = 31. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
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Figure A1: Timeline: each unit represents a year y.
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(a) Expenditures (b) Revenues
(c) Deficits
Figure A2: Histograms of expenditures, revenues, and deficits. An observation is a
municipality-year. Observations above the 99th and below the 1st percentiles have
been excluded to facilitate comprehension (90th and 1st for deficits). Bins are 100-
euro wide (5 percentage points for deficit).
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(a) Log Expenditures (b) Log Revenues
(c) Deficit
Figure A3: Robustness to Bandwidth Choice. Circles represent the estimated treat-
ment effect, using different bandwidth choices (x-axis). Lines represent the 95%
confidence interval (standard errors clustered at the municipality level). I report
all possible bandwidths from 10 to 150 inhabitants. (The smaller sample sizes for
bandwidths below 10 yield large confidence intervals—larger than .2, or around 20%
of expenditures and revenues—for smaller bandwidths.)
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(a) Log Expenditures (t-1) (b) Log Revenues (t-1)
(c) Deficit (t-1)
Figure A4: Placebo Tests: Effect of direct democracy on lagged expenditures, rev-




umyt, where Populationj ,mt is a dummy that indicates whether municipality m has
population size j at term t. In the y-axis, I plot the estimated coefficients δˆj , av-
eraged to 4-inhabitant-wide bins. I normalize the coefficients so that the average
bin immediately to the right of the threshold takes the value of zero. The lines are
linear fits on δˆj , fitted separately for observations above and below the threshold. I
use the observations within the optimal bandwidth for LogExpendituresmyt , so that
all graphs show the same range in the x-axis.
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(a) Expenditures (b) Expenditures
(c) Revenues (d) Deficit
Figure A5: The effect of political parties on policy under representative democracy,
following Equation (4). The x-axis shows the difference in the percent of votes
between the PP and the PSOE in local elections. The sample is restricted to elections
in which those two parties were the two most-voted parties. The bins are local
averages of the dependent variables at 1-percentage-point intervals. The lines are
fits of linear regressions run separately at both sides of the threshold.
Figure A6: Histogram of RW Difference (difference in percentage points between the
PP votes and the PSOE votes in local elections). An observation is a municipality-
year. Bins are 1-percentage-point wide. The sample is restricted to elections in
which the PP and the PSOE were the two most-voted parties.
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